Session #2 -- Consensus building around WS1 definition requirements

Transcript

Transcript CCWG ACCT #2 20 January.doc

Transcript CCWG ACCT #2 20 January.pdf

Recording

The Adobe Connect recording is available here: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p6g8b4k5j9y/

The audio recording is available here:  https://icann.box.com/shared/static/as1422hwzo5kad3se35q5psdh944obek.mp3

Notes:

Tuesday, 20 January -- session 2 (starting at 9:30 UTC)

Agenda Item - Consensus building around WS1 requirements

live edits to MindMap -- edits list the following symbols:
- 1 = included in WS!
- 2 = included in WS2
- (-) = remove from MindMap

To get this list manageable, focus on priorities

Narrow things by "what needs to be done" and "what needs to be committed to" in time for the transition

Get items (1) implemented and to strive for implementation on the items listed as (2).

Use this document, subject to constant review, as the foundation for work moving forward
Sebastien Bachollet objected.

This list is used as guidance to the work of the group.

Next, need to address community composition

Recap:
The morning sessions may have appeared slow, but we have made significant progress. We've agreed that the list is provisional, that the list should remain flexible (not blocking list), need to have timeline for overall items, and list of mechanisms that should not replace the bottom up process. theses are not decision making processes, but rather accountability mechanisms.

The list is the building block upon which we can build our work now.

After lunch, we will focus on how we organize this work (called "work parties"?), the scope, and how we address on a global scale.

Chat Transcript

 Grace Abuhamad: (1/20/2015 10:10) The CCWG is now on a 20-minute break. We will reconvene at 09:30 UTC.

  Bruce Tonkin: (10:38) Agree with Thomas - that it is important to work onteh "hard nuts" to crack.

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:39) TBD? Enhance the way the Board and SO/ACs are working

  Avri Doria: (10:39) the nuts are found in fruit

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:39) That to some extent, yes

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:39) Agree. But would also say that we have to get this right, and while I hope that can be done by BA, I am not confident of that yet.

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:40) TBD? Enhance the way the Board and SO/ACs are working - Ensure WS 2 gets CONSTITUTED or INITIATED

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:40) That is a yes

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:40) Recall Board Members - No in WS1

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:41) Prevent the Board from acting out of its mission - Not at all workable during WS!

  Bruce Tonkin: (10:41) Jordan - I think the key is to have a work plan - work out what can be done by Bueons Aires.   Some topics may be hard to reach consesnsus on - and they may take longer than Beunos Aires.

  Josh Baulch: (10:42) Janvier - Please MUTE

  Alice Jansen: (10:42) Please mute your line if not speaking

  Bruce Tonkin: (10:42) For those in the room - also make sure you mute your PC or other device connected to the chat room.

  Janvier Ngnoulaye: (10:44) Yes it what I did, but it unmute automatically  after some time!!!

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:44) so we will look at these requrements and then start talking about mechanisms?

  Josh Baulch: (10:44) thank you, you are muted now :)

  Grace Abuhamad: (10:44) I've force muted you... You should be all set

  Janvier Ngnoulaye: (10:44) I did not get sound

  Keith Drazek: (10:45) Complication is not an excuse for pushing something important from WS1 to WS2. It just means we need to focus our energies on it to ensure the Board accepts and implements or commits to implement prior to transition.

  Janvier Ngnoulaye: (10:46) OK @ Josh & Grace

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (10:46) Time contstraints, cost constraints, who has standing to bring an action also fall under "reform of review and redress"

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:47) Next steps on working methods - if we get the requirements done today and priorities, and an initial discussion of mechanisms, then surely we need next to 1) elaborate what the requirements are, so people can easily read and understand it; 2) work in working groups on the mechanisms that can deliver these; 3) integrate legal feedback; 4) prepare a consolidated proposal; 5) prepare bylaw or other changes that would implement it

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair 2: (10:47) @Jordan: working methods this afternoon

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:48) ah ok. sorry :)

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:49) Too many items for WS1.  Can't be done

  Matthew Shears: (10:49) Separability of the IANA function

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (10:49) +1 to Kavouss

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (10:49) + 1 Kavouss to "transfer " IANA functions

  Wolf-Ulrich Knoben: (10:50) @Kavouss, I agree

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:51) This Tree is the cut of WS1? Or of all requirements?

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:51) ah, just answered.

  Matthew Shears: (10:51) What does "direct the Board..." mean - is that as a result of bottom-up processes?

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:51) we haven't decided yet what is in WS1 or 2

  Keith Drazek: (10:51) I agree with Bruce that a timeline and worklist targeting Buenos Aires (June 21-25) would be helpful, once we have an agreed-to list of WS1 items.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (10:52) yes

  Malcolm Hutty: (10:52) All WS1: not for completion, but certainly for commitment. Which means agreement on the core principles in each of these areas

  Matthew Shears: (10:53) should not be transferring policy - just the contract/function

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (10:53) + 1 Mattthew

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:53) @ Malcom  even for agreement, this is an ambitious list

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:54) We still need to scope these up - I don't think we should now try and determine how much we can do, but I defer to the working methods thing later.

  Malcolm Hutty: (10:54) @Siva, absolutely, and I greatly regret the compressed timescale. But I don't see how we can have confidence in NTIA going away if we don't get commitment on this first

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:55) how do you visualize consensus-building on such topics, so many of them, within a five months?

  Matthew Shears: (10:55) agree that "nuclear option" is poor wording

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (10:55) + 1 Matthew:  we are trying to separate IANA operation from policy

  Matthew Shears: (10:56) we should remove IANA from this chart and have a placeholder as we are conflating work of the two WGs

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (10:56) There os another entity interested in taking over the policy: the ITU.

  Sivasubramanian M: (10:56) @ Malcolm  There can be an overall commitment to make imporovements, but precise agreement on details is impossible to achieve.

  Malcolm Hutty: (10:56) As Keith said earlier, complexity is not a reason to punt something to WS2 if it is necessary to achieve confidence for transition

  Malcolm Hutty: (10:57) @Siva, agree wrt "precise agreement on details" being left until later; we will have to discuss what constitutes a "core principle" and what a "precise detail"...

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (10:59) but we will have to get specific real soon

  Matthew Shears: (11:00) + 1 Steve for so lond as there is explcit noting of ensuring that WS2 gets done

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:03) + Matttew.

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:04) Agree Matthew except that we won't get real consensus on ws2 in time so we need to focus on the empowerment of the community to address ws2. I suspect that the reality of ws2 is that it will go on indefinitely once the community is empowered.

  Avri Doria: (11:04) might be worth making explicit reference to ATRT2 9.2

  Avri Doria: (11:04) 9.3, incidentally is the ombidsman stuff.

  Matthew Shears: (11:05) @ Jonathan - agree - WS2 will go on no doubt - just wanted to make sure that we have an explicit commitment to exactly that

  Avri Doria: (11:07) i.e IRP "special Group" - ATRT2 9.2 recommendations

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:07) I'm not sure "obligations to others" is enough.  We also need the board to resist doing things itself in this sub-branch under "prevent from acting outside mission".  imposing obligations on others is not the only way this can be done.

  Avri Doria: (11:08) and ie. Ombudsamn changes ref ATRT2 9.3

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:08) it just lacks sufficient specificity to identifry a mechanism to implement @ Alan

  Matthew Shears: (11:08) + 1 Robin

  Samantha Eisner: (11:11) @Robin, is clarification of the standard of review of the IRT one of the ways that you would see "prevent from acting outside mission" being achieved?  

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (11:11) I understand the reluctance to consider the "nuclear option" to include policy. And I agree "nuclear" is not the right choice of words, except for the fact that both options (the true nuclear one and the one we are discussing) have in common is that having the option assures that it will never be used to the maximum possible.  That said, it is just that as a ccTLD (registry) manager, I do not think I would be overly impressed by the stich that the administration of changes to the .nl zone file might be taken away from SIDN,and  only under the circumstances that the execution of that administration failed, as long as SIDN would keep her other responsabilities(among which policy for .nl)

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:11) not really, samantha.

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:12) The option should be available as Malcom has mentioned but want to double check if this is the operational communities which does this. in names case, IANA CWG on names.

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (11:12) re my previous post: not "stitch" but "threat"

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:13) @ChrisDisspain, this very WG is the leverage of the technical function of IANA transition to achieve broader aims. If you say that's "unacceptable", you're disagreeing with the circumstances that gave rise to this group

  Keith Drazek: (11:13) I agree with Malcolm that the possibility of future severability (or rebid) might be a key accountability mechanism....incentive for ICANN to act in the interests of the community.  That said, it should be a placeholder at this time as we await the CWG Transition work product. It should not be removed entirely from our list, but it's premature to discuss details.

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:13) agreed, Keith.

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (11:14) @Malcolm:  the NTIA contract separates iana functions and policy.  Linking them for moving the IANA "contract" is an unacceptable remedy for a policy decision failure

  Matthew Shears: (11:14) + 1 Keith

  Seun Ojedeji: (11:15) ++1000 to the current speaker

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:15) What Jonathan suggests makes perfect sense to me

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:16) Seems to be alot of cous on "control" or "direction" of the Board, rather than focussing on acocounability - which is ensuring that the Baord does its jobs and the mechansims for dealing with stiatutions when the organization doesn't do its job properly.

  Matthew Shears: (11:16) Like the idea of community empowerment in the preamble

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:16) +1 Keith. That's exactly what I want.

  David McAuley (GNSO): (11:16) +1 AMalcolm, @Keith

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:17) The more the "community" in this context is directing the Board - the more it becomes the board and will need the same accounability mechansisms.   e.g what hapens when you are not happy with the work a review team has done and directed the Board to do.

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:17) None of the accounability mechansims currently could be used for say a review team going rogue.

  Chris Disspain: (11:18) Bruce + 1

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair 2: (11:18) @Bruce & Chris : add this to contingencies and we'll stress test

  Keith Drazek: (11:18) I agree completely with Jonathan's comments, but I also believe it's premature to entirely remove discussion of the possibility of a future rebid of IANA functions if the community feels that all other options have been exhausted.

  Matthew Shears: (11:19) Agree Keith

  Chris Disspain: (11:19) @ Keith...yes but that is the function

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:19) @Bruce, the idea of "community support required for change of bylaws" is relevant to a review team going rogue

  Chris Disspain: (11:19) and I believe that he CWG will creat e a mechanim for that

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:19) @ Bruce - I don't agree. The Board faces accountability mechanisms because it governs the organisation. The community doesn't. It doesn't need unless it's organised strangely anything similar.

  Chris Disspain: (11:20) @ jordan - yes but if the comuniyt can direct then it becomes a governor also

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:20) no

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:20) But Joran if the Communiyt is directing the Board/organization rather than recommending - then it start to govern the organization.

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:20) You can't make someone accounable for something they don't agree to.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:20) that's like saying your members are your governors because they vote on your business plan or whatever

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:21) I agree with Steve here.

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:21) Normally when person A is accountable to person B for doing something, the two person have reached agreement on the something first.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (11:21) yup works for me

  Matthew Shears: (11:21) + 1 Steve

  Chris Disspain: (11:21) Jordan - there is a difference between approving something and directing someting

  Keith Drazek: (11:21) I don't want a community/membership structure to replace the role of the Board, or direct the Board. The community/member structure should be the new backstop replacing the current role of NTIA. It would be an escalation point for a very limited set of powers for review/redress and possible approval/disapproval of things like annual budgets.

  Chris Disspain: (11:21) Agree Keith

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:21) +1 Keith (again!)

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:21) +1 Keith

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:22) or in my own case, it's like saying that my Council doesn't govern the organisation because members have to approve the budget, or can force a different decision. It's nonsense to suggest they would need to face accountability for exercising their rights.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:22) + 1 Keith.

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:22) The Keith explained makes sense

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:22) the organisation is accountable to the community, not the other way around.

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:22) I think that is fine Keith - if it is operating in the way that members or sharehodlers normally do - but I am just seeing scope creep on a number of topics on the screen - lots of directing and binding etc.

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:22) what Keith suggests makes sense to me

  Matthew Shears: (11:23) Not sure I agree that merging AOC into bylaws should go into 2

  Avri Doria: (11:23) but merging into bylaw is WS!

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:23) recommeinding, reaching agreement, and then holding the board accouable for what is agreed seems more sensible to me.

  Chris Disspain: (11:24) Jordan - what you say may be true but it is entirely dependent on how one defines 'the community' in each case and it strikes me as slightly bizarre that you woud be arguing that a group that directs (on behalf of a larger group) doesn't need to be accountable  to that larger group

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:24) IRT etc can then be used if the community believes that the board has gone outside of the bylaws, policies etc.

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:24) can we add to the sub-branch "prevent from imposing obligations to others or taking inappropriate actions".  Imposing obligations on others isn't the only way the org could act outside its mission

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:24) e.g with respect o bylaws - I think both the Baord and Community should agree bylaws changes, and then the Board is helld accouable for ensuring those bylaws are adhered to.

  Chris Disspain: (11:24) Agree Bruce

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:25) Chris - they are accountable to them by their existince, so we need to analyse and explain that, but I am taking it for granted I guess.

  Keith Drazek: (11:25) Understood Bruce. This is a worthwhile discussion, but ultimately we don't want to transfer the same accountability challenges we currently face to a new layer or group. We need to focus on a community structure/group that has the ability to weigh in if/when all other mechanisms have been tried and exhausted. Plus budget approval/disapproval and approval  of changes to future bylaws.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:25) Bruce: disagree. I don't think that the Board should be able to stop a bylaw change that the ICANN community wants.

  David McAuley (GNSO): (11:25) +1 @Jordan

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:25) Yes I agree Keith - it just needs to follow a normal flow.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:26) Yes, there are issues in defining what the "community" is or how the entity operates but there isn't a need for mutuality of power or authority here in my opinion. There is a need to turn it around.

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (11:26) I understand AoC review mechanisms to encompass all ICANN functionalities and  operations (includign refining Board relationships with SOs and ACs by the way)- so more appropriate for WS2.

  Chris Disspain: (11:26) Jordan, in essence I accept the point re bylaws provided that we are clear what we mean by community in that case

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:26) Like the words people are using - "refusing to take action" is alot different from refusing to comply with the bylaws.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:26) Chris: yes - we need great clarity.

  Matthew Shears: (11:26) +1 Avri

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:27) Bruce: yes - I;d never support a sort of wishlist approach or referendum based decision making.

  Chris Disspain: (11:27) So for example would only the ccNSO community need to direct on a by law re ccTLDs?

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:27) +1 to Avri's point

  Samantha Eisner: (11:27) @Keith, agree that it's not about developing additional accountability measures to go onto the community-driven parts of group, but instead acknowledging the accountability that all actors within ICANN have to each other in

  Samantha Eisner: (11:27) in the work throughout the community

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (11:28) I agree mission creep is a WS1 issue.

  Avri Doria: (11:29) i think it is an amorphous gola and can't be achieved in WS1

  Matthew Shears: (11:29) We should be able to qualify "outside mission" so that it can be credibly addressed in WS1

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:30) @ Avri - I think the "who decides what it outside mission" and "what we do about it" questions are ones we should try and deal with

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:30) Yes - at some pit a review of the current language used in the bylaws for mission needs addressing.   The wordig is quite technical land not well understood by most in the community I thinkk.

  Samantha Eisner: (11:30) If the mission is in the bylaws, and we develop a better solution for review or redress of actions that are alleged outside of bylaws, doesn't that go far for addressing mission creep?

  Keith Drazek: (11:30) @Samantha, I didn't say there shouldn't be additional accountabiilty mechanisms. I said that the community via a membership structure needs to have certain limited powers over the Board. Agree that accountability is needed among all groups and participants, but the key focus here is ensuring the Board is accountable to the community.

  Avri Doria: (11:30) maybe we can call it nice to have just in case i am right and it is fruit that is impossible to pick.

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (11:31) Dear all, regrettably, due to an event at SIDN including all staff and my supervisory board, I have to leave our meeting early and head back.I would like to thank you all, and our three chairs and staff especially, for an excellently run and very open, dynamic and productive meeting. Save travels to you all!

  Avri Doria: (11:31) call it 1.5?

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:31) OK with having AoC merge into bylaws and prevent ICANN from acting outside its mission both in WS1

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:31) @Avri, I never know whether to speak up or chat but I think the point is again empowerment not accomplishment. we won't prevent scope creep in ws1 but we will empower the community to prevent scope creep in the future

  Avri Doria: (11:32) but that is already contained in the top one.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (11:32) safe travels to you Roelof

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:32) Bye @Roelof and thanks for your excellent inputs!

  Avri Doria: (11:32) budgets controls noew activities.  

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:33) agree so  it's just an expression of priorities more than anything else

  Avri Doria: (11:33) i guess i put it in the same category as tilting at windmills, except for budget restiction mechansims.

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:33) Thanks for attending @Roeloffand for your contributions.

  Avri Doria: (11:33) and this is supposed to be a list fo what we can get done.

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:34) agree. it's a bit like "legislative intent"

  Avri Doria: (11:34) as this list is supposed to gate the transtion it should only contain the doable in finite  (short ) time

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:34) Avri - I don't think budget controls extra activities.   Activites cna be prioritized in different ways against any given budget.    The key that defines scope creep is actually the strategic and operating plans.

  Avri Doria: (11:35) so are we saying that strat and op plans belong under the top item?

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:35) + Steve, new things should go through the standard process, should respect the bottom-up process

  Matthew Shears: (11:35) + 1 Steve re importance of bottom-up process

  Avri Doria: (11:35) stra plan is there.

  Keith Drazek: (11:36) Was NetMundial and the NetMundial Initiative in the Strat and Ops plan? Or the budget?  ;-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:36) of course not.

  Avri Doria: (11:36) strat lan is already in top one.  if that is the mechansim for controling scope creep then that is what we need, not an aspirational goal that we can't check off the list.

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:37) @Avri, I wouldn't, no. And I would remove "budgets & Strat plan" from "approval of key decisions, relying on the section on constraining mission as the appropriate level of communinty direct constraint over strat

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:38) I don't agree, @Malcolm

  Avri Doria: (11:38) but it can't be achieve in a check off manner and there =fore can be used to block transtion.  i do not think anything undoable belongs on this list.

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:39) @Avri, clarification of mission is not an aspirational goal, it is a requirement to set a standard that redress mechanisms can apply, so someone can overturn a decision on the grounds that it's outside ICANN's Mission.

  Avri Doria: (11:39) also scope creep is the most subjective of interpretations.

  Avri Doria: (11:39) we all have different notions of what that means.

  Avri Doria: (11:40) i see it as a poison piill in this list.

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:40) Steve DelBianaco has already made real progress on developing definition of mission, on the list

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:40) Agreed Malcolm.    MIssoion, bylaws and policiy need to be cearly understood so that accounability mechansims can be implemented - particularly when using independent panelists.

  Keith Drazek: (11:41) Nothing we're talking about should "block" transition.

  Avri Doria: (11:41) Keith, i disagree.  WS1 is about what in a normative sense, can block.

  Matthew Shears: (11:42) I think we have done enough triage and should move forward with the list as is

  Avri Doria: (11:42) WS1 is about things that MUST be completed before transtion, and if they can't be or do not need to be then they do not beleong on WS1

  Keith Drazek: (11:43) To clarify, I meant the inclusion of these issues in WS1 should not block the transition. They will enable the transition. The key is to include items in WS1 that will enable WS2.

  Matthew Shears: (11:44) further refinement of these elements will inevitably lead to further specificity and focus

  Avri Doria: (11:44) WS1 is stuff that needs to be in place in order to allow transtion.  and yes, it is the basis for WS2 ongoing work.

  Avri Doria: (11:44) WS1 gates the transtion as i understand it.

  Keith Drazek: (11:44) @Avri, it's not must be COMPLETED...there's an acknowledgement in our charter that WS1 could be "committed to" as well.

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (11:44) Agree strongly that no mechanisms or new multi-stakeholder accountability super-structure (council or whatever) should subordinate or weaken bottom up process development.

  Avri Doria: (11:44) committed to in a guaranteed way.

  Keith Drazek: (11:44) Yes.

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:45) +1 Mark

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:45) WS1 is about things that must be completed or committed to before transmission

  Keith Drazek: (11:45) Committed to = committed to

  Malcolm Hutty: (11:45) +1 Lars: WS1 is things that need to be dealt with before transition, not things we think we can fully agree and implement in the next five weeks

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (11:46) @ Erik: CWG is awaiting specific  outcome from CCWG - the conditionality issue.

  Avri Doria: (11:47) committmentments without guarantees are just empty promisses.

  Matthew Shears: (11:47) Charter: Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition;

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair-ALAC): (11:48) If we put in place the mechanism to initiate action against board inaction, the problem might be solved. Does it make sense?

  Matthew Shears: (11:48) so "in place" or "comitted to"

  Avri Doria: (11:49) i really think they need to be in place.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (11:49) +1 @Leon.   it is up to us to use our bottom-up processes to deliver WS2 items.    If the Board does not accept, we'll have ability to reverse the Board because of the powers we obtained in WS1

  Keith Drazek: (11:50) Exactly Steve.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (11:50) So, and Deadlines for WS2 are deadlines we are imposing on ourselves!

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:50) + 1 Leon, Steve.

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (11:51) agree with Leon

  Avri Doria: (11:52) i thnk there are some- change of bylaws, review & redress and remove Board members that MUST be in place.  everything esle is nice to have and thus a so-called commitment is adequate.

  Keith Drazek: (11:52) Agree completely Avri

  Matthew Shears: (11:52) + 1 Avri

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:52) Indeed

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:53) even those are "mechanisms" when all is said and done

  Bruce Tonkin: (11:53) Alan that means thsi CCWG will need to be accounable to the community to finish Work stream 2 :-)

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (11:54) I think WS2 will be a very iterative process. For example, "reply period" for comments is now gone because it was useless.

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (11:55) +1 Avri for the summary

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair-ALAC): (11:57) We do have review teams but we lack the ability to have the board execute the recommendations/resolutions of such teams

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (11:57) it's tricky to make points when people in front of you are having a separate meeting... ;)

  Keith Drazek: (11:58) You pulled it off nicely.... ;-)

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (11:59) I promise you @jordan I was paying attention to your intervention :-)

  Matthew Shears: (11:59) you know what they say - front rows drive the discussion; back rows have the most fun

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (12:00) For clarity, sunsetting an AoC  review would probably mean no NEW substantive review, but we would need to do the post-portem review of the implementation of the last review. That is a very substantial effort.

  Bruce Tonkin: (12:01) Yes - Steve - I thin kit is important that we have appropraite recosdieration process, and also thresholds for when they apply.   We need to be careful that we just automatically end up with recosndieration from every panel decision that gets made.    So "appeals" are good - but we also need to work onteh grounds for appeal.   They cna be broader than just process.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair 2: (12:02) @Bruce: this points to the notion of "escalation process". We will need that

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (12:02) @Bruce, the need for consensus means this will happen VERY infrequently

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (12:02) indeed

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:02) Do people agree we need to understand the whole picture and organise a bit of a path for the work, before we finally finalise the WS1 requirements? Or is that a working methods thing?

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (12:02) think it's working methods

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (12:04) @Matthew - agree, but I would suggest that that needs a commitment and timetable for ws2 to be included in ws1

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (12:04) I am comfortable with the items listed as WS1 on this mind map.

  Bruce Tonkin: (12:04) Yes - @Jonathan - I was referringmore to t changing the existing recosndieration process - where any affected party can launch recosdieration.   I agree if the "Community" mechansims is used - that in itself is a signfiicant threshold to initaite a process.    However I think we need to enhance recosnideration for individual communiyt members as well - but maybe that is work stream 2.   It is certainly an ATRT2 recommendation.

  Wolf-Ulrich Knoben: (12:04) Yes, Marti

  Wolf-Ulrich Knoben: (12:04) Martin

  Matthew Shears: (12:06) Just to be clear - I think we have to look at the currentlyu identified WS1 items as either "in place" or committed to"

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:06) I think the list stands as it is, happy/ready to move on

  Chris Disspain: (12:06) Matthew + 1

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (12:06) @Matthew:  agree

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (12:07) But for ws2 we need to have a clear commitment and timetable for implementation

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (12:07) a.so agree @matthew

  Matthew Shears: (12:07) + 1 Martin

  Chris Disspain: (12:07) agree MArtin

  Keith Drazek: (12:08) It's possible that we'll identify items that can be shifted from this list to WS2, but it's premature to make that call at this time.  We may well identify some WS1 items that adequately enable some of the others on the list. That'll be the work of the next phase.

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (12:08) And is setting the timetable part of ws1?

  Wolf-Ulrich Knoben: (12:08) @Martin; put the commitment to the WS1 basket

  Matthew Shears: (12:08) yes need that "ensuring WS2 gets done" commitment in there as well

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:10) good idea and thanks for voicing it, @Martin

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (12:11) I agree with your suggestion Martin

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:23) Is ICANN best seen as a federation or a unitary organisation?

  Bruce Tonkin: (12:25) Here is the section of the Articles of Incorporation quoted by Steve:

  Bruce Tonkin: (12:25) These Articles may be amended by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the directors of the Corporation. When the Corporation has members, any such amendment must be ratified by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the members voting on any proposed amendment.

  Bruce Tonkin: (12:26) Generally we use the term "Super-Majority" in the bylaws to mean 2/3 majority.

  Chris Disspain: (12:29) So, if I understand the proposal correctly the idea is that there is a cross-community committee that is empowered to trigger an accountability mechanismby a 2/3rds majority

  Avri Doria: (12:30) Confusion Alert:  dont we all have to take things back to our home bodies and they decide to support or not based on their own bottom procedures?

  Chris Disspain: (12:30) so would that mean that one SO's reps could vote against but everyone else vote yes and there still be a 2/3 majority or does it need to be 2/3rds of each set of reps?

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:30) that's one mechanism, but we aren't talking about mechanisms yet

  Chris Disspain: (12:31) we seem to be right now

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:31) and Chris your point goes to my question about federation or unitary.. :) i think ICANN practically has to be a federation

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:31) which means we do need to set veto points and balances etc and autonomy for various constituencies

  Chris Disspain: (12:31) agree jordan

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:31) depending on how complex or complete the powers of the "review group" are

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:31) if the can just cause recommital and just approve or send back, then maybe not

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:32) (which would be simpler)

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (12:35) GAC rep or liaison being able to refer back to full GAC  for a potion to take is a possibel practicable option at tiem when GAC is workign more intersessionally than previously. An option therefore. in my view  to discuss with GAC colleagues,.

  Mark Carvell  GAC - UK Govt: (12:36) For "potion" read "position" - may need some magic to throw in though!

  Chris Disspain: (12:36) I prefer potion, Mark

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (12:36) :-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz): (12:38) Red or white, Chris?

  Keith Drazek: (12:39) Agree with Chris that the legitimacy and decision-making should be with the community structures.

  Keith Drazek: (12:40) and that it helps to address accountability concerns of the membership committee

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC-AP Region): (12:40) yes indeed!

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (12:42) we did make signficant progress this morning!

  Keith Drazek: (12:44) A very productive and constructive morning session. Good stuff....

  Alice Jansen: (12:44) The CCWG is on a 60-minute lunch break