Proposed Agenda: 

Review & Test Models

Notes

Review & test models (part 2)

In last session, group discussed models on the "frontburner":

• • Contract Co. : How do you decide who the Board would be?
  • Accountability enhancements to ICANN
  • Hybrid model (affiliate) --
  • Hybrid model with shared services: co-owned by ICANN, IETF, RIRs with shared services agreements

We'll now clarify exactly what we mean by the "frontburner" options. For the hybrid, there are still some open questions. 

Do we in all cases contemplate a separate legal entity or do we consider a divisional form of governance?

Are we looking at ...

• • External
  • Internal without subsidiary
  • Internal with subsidiary

Yes, it's internal with subsidiary at time 0, but we could separate in the future if wanted/needed. 

The internal model is not the status quo. Can you bring in the hybrid/integrated model at the last stage?

Principles / Requirements

Sidley has compiled the NTIA priniciples and the CWG legal scoping document principles. What are some of the principles to add?

• • Capture (but needs to be better defined)
  • Stability in case of strife (legal attack, etc) --> covered in  NTIA principles
  • Diversity of community (gTLDs and ccTLDs)

Complete: Sidley needs to see Principles document 

List of items to 'stress test' our work against

• • Implcations (RFP4)
  • CCWG Stress Tests
  • SAC 069 
  • Principles

Challenge with table approach is that it doesn't really take us to where we need to go. It seemed to make more sense to do pros/cons

There is no model on the table that does not have the ability to separate 

-- > there is a principle of separability that the CWG is working with 

WILL DO LIVE EDITS -- NOTES WILL BE PAUSED

Action Item:  Grace will send edited version of slides at lunch break  

External > Contract Co. 

• • Moves stewardship to another organization 

Internal > Accountability Mechanism with functions separation

• • We may not need to create subsidiary right at the point of transition, but may need to work to establish it within first 2 years, for example. This is so that it's done before time of stress

Principles will be a test

Action Items

Grace will send edited version of slides at lunch break

Transcript

Transcript CWG IANA F2F Session 6 27 March.doc

Transcript CWG IANA F2F Session 6 27 March.pdf

Recording

The Adobe Connect recording is available here:  https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p7ad0qb51bq/

The audio recording is available here:  http://audio.icann.org/gnso/gnso-cwg-iana-2-27mar15-en.mp3

Documents Presented

Slides_Day2_edit2.pptx

Chat Transcript

  Brenda Brewer: (03:33) CWG IANA F2F Day 2 Session 2

  Grace Abuhamad: (03:51) We will start shortly

  Seun Ojedeji: (03:52) Thanks Grace

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (03:58) For those of us on twitter some of us are using the #IANASteward hashtag if anyone wants to join in.

  Graeme Bunton - RrSG: (03:59) If this discussion ended up in some diagrams from Xplain, that could be useful

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:00) Timestamps!

  Alan Greenberg: (04:00) Grace Abuhamad: Timestamps!    :-)

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:00) @Graeme, yes, Xplane is observing in back for that purpose

  Matthew Shears: (04:02) affiliate offers organizational separation which provides for more of a MoU/SLA based relationship with IANA

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:02) To answer Sidley question, yes a distinct legal entity for IANA which can be a party to a contract

  Matthew Shears: (04:03) maybe we need to drop external and internal

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:04) looks like we have 4 options left thought it was 3?

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:04) All, to look at the shared model we are discussing, please see https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZpCjh4hoRJ1CaYpw30f3zB0gogGa7ZS1eKyum-rJvCI/edit?usp=sharing

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:04) Greg has got it

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (04:04) Great points Greg

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (04:05) are they /greg on your last point I remain unconvinced

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:05) @Greg what were the operational actions of NTIA that was problematic to replace in Internal model ?

  Wale Bakare: (04:06) It looks like shared services agreements and Contract Co models are similar 

  Greg Shatan: (04:07) @Seun -- it's the contract (and the instructions and requirements within it) that is difficult to replace in the Internal Solution.

  Avri Doria: (04:09) we did that in creating thhe model.  wee are not show horning.  we design the shoe based on the principles and now are trying to see if it fits.

  Avri Doria: (04:09) ... shoehorning ...

  Greg Shatan: (04:11) @Wale, they are the opposite of each other.

  Wale Bakare: (04:11) Would the internal model - Accountability operate as IANA + ICANN?  Who acts as IANA operator?

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:11) Sidley folks, could you please finish the categorization you were outlining?

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:11) @Greg definately not the instruction but just the contract awarding

  Matthew Shears: (04:13) agree Elise - we can call it hybrid as it is in a manner internal and external

  Wale Bakare: (04:13) @Greg, yes i acknowledged the externalization of the Contract Co

  Matthew Shears: (04:16) Chairs - please note that the hybrid model does foresee opt in to acheive a shared services arrangement

  Matthew Shears: (04:17) Tn aqs Avri noted

  Matthew Shears: (04:17) Tn as Avri noted

  Matthew Shears: (04:20) its opt in

  Wale Bakare: (04:21) Yes, 100% agreed to that, the Shared Services Agreements

  Wale Bakare: (04:21) @James, thanks

  Matthew Shears: (04:29) If ICANN falls off a cliff can the IANA function survive?  Like James question.

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:32) @Matthew what a question...its like asking if planet earth sieze to exist will people in it survive

  Chris Disspain: (04:32) yes it can

  Chris Disspain: (04:32) provision can be made for emergency service provision

  Chris Disspain: (04:33) the same principle exists nI  gtlds registry contracts

  Matthew Shears: (04:33) @ Suen - gets ensuring resiliency and continuity

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:33) i think we need to face the fact that every entity has the same question applicable. Its not a question perculiar to ICANN

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:33) Objectives

  Greg Shatan: (04:34) I fear that the IANA transition will be finished before the Principles.

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:34) I don't know what you mean by ICANN falling off the cliff...like ICANN disapear from face of the earth or like ICANN experience a coup

  Avri Doria: (04:35) they can tell us if they consulted them.  no?

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (04:37) They are titled as folloing in the legal scoping document: To that end, the CWG is considering proposals to address the following key elements identifiedby the CWG:

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:38) Principles have been sent to client committee list

  Elise Lindeberg GAC: (04:38) +1 Jordan

  Jodan Carter: (04:39) Just trying to get some clarity around the framework here - I think we can have a v useful & interesting discussion on what is already there

  Greg Shatan: (04:40) @Stephanie, thanks!

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:40) Agree that evaluating against this slide would be helpful step forward

  Matthew Shears: (04:41) I would note this in the other principles: 10 10.          Multistakeholderism: any proposal must foster multi-stakeholder participation in the future oversight of the IANA functions.

  Matthew Shears: (04:41) just so it is not lost.

  Matthew Shears: (04:41) it is slightly different than the NTIA requirement

  Sharon Flanagan (sidley): (04:41) good point Matthew

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:41) ICANN is the entire community so if it falls down the cliff then the community has fallen as well, we need to stop referring to ICANN as if its an independent organisation that just came from nowhere. Continuity of IANA is to be ensured by continuity/existence of the community since they are the once that will ultimately determine whether another operator to run IANA

  Jodan Carter: (04:42) Why don't we use the ones set out for our testing today, noting we aren't making final calls today?

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (04:42) ICANN is not the entire community Seun.

  Jodan Carter: (04:42) Not to replace the need for the full assessment.

  Chris Disspain: (04:42) Agree jordan

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:42) *once = ones*

  Jodan Carter: (04:43) I don't agree with the proposition that the community would be the casue of execution failure, Seun... :-)

  jorge cancio GAC: (04:45) ICANN is one form in which the commuity is constituted, but not the community itself...

  Wale Bakare: (04:46) Why referring to ICANN as a "community" or i didn't capture the discussion correctly?

  Jodan Carter: (04:46) the Internet community, some of it, organises itself through ICANN

  Jodan Carter: (04:47) the subset of the Internet community that organises through ICANN is the ICANN community

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (04:47) Agree Jordan, but speaking even more specifically the IANA has 3 groups of customers, Names Number and Protocols, not all of whom engagne in ICANN

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:47) @Jordan Well the ccwg is currently creating a mechanism and if the mechanism is implemented and there is a failure in the execution of it...then we the community would not have done a good job with the mechanism provided; the mechanism provided needs to ensure that execution is done as desribed with necessary recourse if done otherwise (and i think ccwg is well on top of this)

  Jodan Carter: (04:47) accountability helps, for sure, Seun

  Jodan Carter: (04:48) I note that a contract that can be cancelled is a pretty good accountability tool, for the record ;)

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:49) where can i find the slide @Grace

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:49) I sent them via email this morning Seun

  Grace Abuhamad: (04:50) Email was titled "Slides Day 2"

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:51) thanks Grace

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:51) Yes, I'd really like to hear indepedent legal perspective

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:52) I hope these are legal pros and cons?

  Jodan Carter: (04:52) Good question to clarify, Seun

  Jodan Carter: (04:53) There you go, Seun

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:54) Any of them could fly but what is involved to fly either of them would determine pros and cons

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:55) So i am more interested in the strutural details required to make the options legally viable

  Wale Bakare: (04:55) @Seun, pros and cons should address your point raised about ICANN "off the cliff"

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:56) @Wale Actually we had a lot of documentation about practically pros and cons created in the past....surveys were done and public comments were made as well

  Matthew Shears: (04:57) does it enhance multistakeholder oversight?

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (04:58) Does this mean we'd need to build ICANN II ?

  Seun Ojedeji: (04:58) but its okay to redo the excercise so long as it will help us get clear direction in the end

  Greg Shatan: (04:58) @Avri, why do you say it is a contract between ICANN and ICANN? Contract Co. is not ICANN.

  Jodan Carter: (04:58) Olivier: definitely not

  Jodan Carter: (04:58) since the contract co only assigns the right to operate

  Jodan Carter: (04:58) it's nothing like ICANN at all

  Jodan Carter: (04:59) it's not even ICANN 0.1. :-)

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (04:59) I am baffled as to how to make a independent Contracting Entity accountable

  Brenden Kuerbis: (04:59) Con: Lack of IANA functional, operational, or structural separation

  Lise Fuhr: (04:59) @Seun we hope that having three models and the legal advice will help us with further considerations regarding the models.

  Seun Ojedeji: (05:00) Thats fine Lise...thanks

  Sarah Falvey - RySG: (05:00) +1 Olivier

  Jodan Carter: (05:00) Olivier: the accountability situation is much simpler than for ICANN, becasue the entity does so much less, and has so little resources

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:00) short of implementing Community review processes of Contract Co. just like in ICANN, how is Contract Co. accountable?

  Jodan Carter: (05:01) because the community appoints its board and can remove them, and because the scope is so limited to a single function it's easy to tell

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:01) @Jordan: but can you backtrack on decisions made by a rogue Contract Co. Board?

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:02) I mean you'd remove directors from the Contract Co. Board *after* they've gone rogue?

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:02) by that time isn't it too late?

  Jodan Carter: (05:02) if we can't make such a body accountable, we really can't make ICANN accountable. Nobody can argue that ICANN is more complex than the CC would be. And as to that - of course you can. You can specify its decisionmaking. Same as eg. the power of GNSO to make G policy. All these problems have already been solved in the ICANN environment already.

  Matthew Shears: (05:03) contract co has no function other than to hold hte contract - legal advice suggested that "Contract Co. could be organized to be “bare bones” with operations limited to being the contracting party for the IANA Functions Contract. "

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:03) @Jordan: I differ: ICANN would be NOTHING without its component communities hence that's the ultimate accountability.

  Jodan Carter: (05:03) lol

  Jodan Carter: (05:03) they have no choice but to be here, Olivier - because ICANN controls the root

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:04) ...and the rest of the world is just willing to follow the root held by ICANN. If ICANN really went that rogue, this could change.

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:04) especially if it's a crisis between ICANN the organisation & ICANN the community

  Wale Bakare: (05:06) The stewardship of NTIA has been function carried by NTIA

  Wale Bakare: (05:06) * I mean external

  Jodan Carter: (05:06) Olivier: exactly, whic his why our job is to try and make sure that we build a structure that minimises the likelihood as this

  Seun Ojedeji: (05:06) i think we may be saying the same thing with some of the pros (contract and clearly implementable is same, also clear seperability and avoids creating a single point of failure is same)

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:08) @Jordan: I think we agree on the destination - we just might differ on our confidence in using one road or another....

  Seun Ojedeji: (05:08) if i may add a con "it could be subject to capture"

  Jodan Carter: (05:08) of course - we are talking about ways to do things, not what is to be done

  Jodan Carter: (05:08) that's why I am confident a consensus can emerge

  Eduardo Diaz - (ALAC): (05:11) @Grace: What do teh different colors mean in the presentation?

  Jodan Carter: (05:11) [the biggest block to a consensus is people having non-negotiable positions...]

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:12) when is the wine being brought into the room?

  Seun Ojedeji: (05:12) another con for contract co is "possible multiciplicity of juridiction (re: the operator and oversight establishment)"

  Greg Shatan: (05:12) But it doesn't preclude separation or separability either.

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:12) SO what your saying Alan is ICANN needs a blue water navy

  Lise Fuhr: (05:12) @Eduardo the green means that they are stated as a con and a pro

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:12) Grace: for clarity, separation of IANA

  Jodan Carter: (05:13) Olivier, it was in the second coffee vat :)

  Stephanie Duchesneau (RySG): (05:13) i disagree with brenden's point, while the existence of a contract may not provide functional separation in itself it does not preclude it

  Greg Shatan: (05:13) +1 to Stephanie.

  Stephanie Duchesneau (RySG): (05:13) and i think that the existence of a contract creates a mechanism where you can mandate that

  Jodan Carter: (05:13) I think Brenden's point responds to an undecided debat

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:13) +1 Stephanie

  Jodan Carter: (05:13) which is the nature of functional (or structural) separation of IANA operations we need

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:14) stephanie, sure, its just not in the current proposal as I understand it

  Jodan Carter: (05:14) Are we talking about just the contract co element of the Frankfurt proposal, or the whole model with MRT etc?

  Avri Doria: (05:14) the reason i see conract co as a contract between ICANN and ICANN is that it is between ICANN the stakeholders the MRT) and ICANN corporate.

  Stephanie Duchesneau (RySG): (05:15) i think we have to be looking at it at a structural level in this conversation

  Jodan Carter: (05:15) because the whole model does definitely hav eoversightof the contract co - that's what the MRT does

  Stephanie Duchesneau (RySG): (05:15) not to the exact letter of each proposal

  Jodan Carter: (05:15) nobody can say that accountability was not considered

  Seun Ojedeji: (05:15) unfortunately i will have to leave now to "attend to the reason why i could not be present physically"....may join later in the day. Thanks everyone

  Jodan Carter: (05:15) Hope you make it back Seun! ciao

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:16) Bye Seun

  Stephanie Duchesneau (RySG): (05:16) i like the green i dont like the +1 in the chart

  Lise Fuhr: (05:17) Thank you Seun - hope you join later

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:17) Can a proponent of this model please define what they mean by functional separation?

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:18) Agree that the degree of legal separation is the big difference Jonathan

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:23) Right, the need to deal with contingencies at the time of great stress

  Jodan Carter: (05:23) Legally separate "what" in the bullet point?

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:23) is a con of this model

  Jodan Carter: (05:24) This con applies to both internal and external, isnt it?

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:25) Yes, because there is no separation of IANA at this stage in the external model

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:25) Can we start talking about what we are separating, stewardship or operation.

  Sarah Falvey - RySG: (05:26) i think the point the legal folks are making is that we would do the work now to legally separate the functions for the external model

  Jodan Carter: (05:26) you'd be assigning operations to another party

  Jodan Carter: (05:26) same in internal and external

  Wale Bakare: (05:27) @James, i would think both stewardship and operation

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:28) i disagree I think this is only talking bout opration, thats why we need clarity

  Jodan Carter: (05:29) in this model, ICANN is the steward

  Greg Shatan: (05:29) Golden Bylaw means all things to all people.  All Hail the Golden Bylaw!

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:30) Yes agree Jordan, this is only talking about operational separtation not stewardship

  Guru Acharya: (05:32) @Avri: What does "feel comfy about status quo" mean? In what sense does an internal solution maintain status quo?

  Grace Abuhamad: (05:33) @Guru -- I added a phrase in parantheses. Does that help clarify

  Grace Abuhamad: (05:33) ?

  Guru Acharya: (05:34) Thanks for adding that. Yes it clarifies.

  Grace Abuhamad: (05:34) Great!

  Greg Shatan: (05:34) The last bullet point under CONS does not accurately capture my point.

  Grace Abuhamad: (05:35) Send me text @Greg and I'll edit

  Greg Shatan: (05:35) It should say:  No place for documentation of operational requirements, oversight or separation (both other models have place for a contract)

  Grace Abuhamad: (05:36) Done @Greg

  Greg Shatan: (05:36) Thanks!ff

  Jodan Carter: (05:36) This group HAS to deal with accountability! goodness me, how does this keep being raised?

  Greg Shatan: (05:36) We never said we were leaving all accountability issues to the CCWG!!!!

  Jodan Carter: (05:37) it's front and centre in the Charter for this CWG

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:37) Yes IANA operational accountability is for the CWG

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:37) yes

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:38) Our charter defines that

  Avri Doria: (05:38) the reason accountability is a con is the degree to which we have to rely on it.  and even if CCWG succeeds, and i think it will, at creating these measures, it will be years, at least until the next ATRT or two, until we will know if they were implemented correctly and whether they work.

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:39) The last bullet point in PROS should also be a CON.

  Chris Disspain: (05:39) avri...same with contract co though, right?

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:39) Just for reference from the CWG charter to help guide us on that point: Accountability for the administration of the IANA functions (i.e., implementation and operationalaccountability), however, is properly within the scope of this working group.

  Thomas Schneider: (05:40) hi all. i would like to make a procedural point at the end of the session before lunch break. tnx. t.

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:40) Agree Avri, there are much simpler ways to achieve accoountability of just the IANA functions

  Lise Fuhr: (05:40) @Thomas Schneider - noted

  jorge cancio GAC: (05:41) agree with Stephanie on the question of needing more clarity on who triggers separability

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (05:42) So the COmmunity could trigger the Golden Disaster Recovery Plan independent of the Board

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:44) Right, this would make the names community approach completely different than numbers and protocols

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:44) Might there be value in having consistency of approaches?

  Donna Austin, RySG: (05:45) You can replicate the requirements of a contract in other ways. The CSC would have an agreement with ICANN about the service levels etc, and the escalation path would still lead you to separation if that was deemed as required.

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:47) CSC cannot have an agreement with anyone.  It's not capable of contracting.

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:47) But the CSC as constructed is not equivalant 

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:47) Thus not capable of enforcing a contract, even if it purports to enter into one.

  Guru Acharya: (05:47) +1 Greg

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:47) to e.g, RIRs, IETF having contract with ICANN to provide IANA functions

  Donna Austin, RySG: (05:47) in my mind you don't need to contract for the provision of a service in order to maintain a level of satisfactory service

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:47) Unless the other party agrees to a shared illusion.

  jorge cancio GAC: (05:47) I fear outsiders may not be able to follow this debate... a thorough explanation, linking principles, options and pros and cons (in light of agreed principles) would be needed if the larger community has to have a chance to understand...

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:48) As the list grows longer, I suspect this is the most complicated model

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:49) This is a working session.  Agree that when we go to the outside world we will need to make this comprehensible.

  Jordan Carter: (05:49) Donna, really? I certainly don't procure important business services without a contract framework.

  Jordan Carter: (05:51) +1 Greg

  Jordan Carter: (05:51) is this comment from Eduardo mixing up this model with the internal/hybrid model?

  Chris Disspain: (05:52) so Jordan, Intenret NZ would be [reareed to contract with ICANN or whoever for the segvoces?

  Chris Disspain: (05:52) services?

  Chris Disspain: (05:52) prepared to contract

  Jordan Carter: (05:52) That's never been our position any more than yours, stop FUDDING things Chris :-)

  Chris Disspain: (05:52) I'm not....I'm asking because I want clarity not FUD

  Jordan Carter: (05:53) Would you let AusRegistry operate AU without a contract?

  Chris Disspain: (05:53) Nope

  Guru Acharya: (05:53) And NTIA is a very special stakeholder in this process. Thier views deserve a special point of view.

  Jordan Carter: (05:53) I certanly wouldn't let NZRS operate .nz without a contract

  Chris Disspain: (05:53) My point is not that there shoufdn't be a contract

  Donna Austin, RySG: (05:53) @Jordan, I guess I've always looked at this from the perspective that NTIA intended to transfer its responsibilities to ICANN and therefore the contract would no longer be required.

  Chris Disspain: (05:53) But you could though

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:53) Very difficult to hear

  Chris Disspain: (05:53) because they are a subsidiary

  Guru Acharya: (05:54) NTIA obviously does not participate at an equal footing

  Jordan Carter: (05:54) NTIA made its policy choices in the 1990s, we are trying to solve for the 2020s and beyond

  Guru Acharya: (05:54) I strongly urge that "NTIA favours ..." should be deleted as it represents the view of one stakeholder group

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:54) +1 Jordan

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:55) NTIA is the ultimate approver, not merely another stakeholder.

  Chris Disspain: (05:55) It is the view of mroe than 1 stakeholder and individual views are beong put up

  Jordan Carter: (05:55) We could have no contract if we have workable accountability in place is my presumption.

  Chris Disspain: (05:55) agree Jordan

  Jordan Carter: (05:55) that's why part of the scope of this CWG is accountability for the IANA functions

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:55) Yes that is better woding, NTIA have not officially said anything yet

  Jordan Carter: (05:56) I think Thomas makes a great point - we have to zoom this out and represent it with stark clarity and crispness

  Chris Disspain: (05:56) agree

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:56) On the other hand, you don't sell sausage by giving tours of a sausage factory.

  Jordan Carter: (05:56) For the process "We looked at the legal landscape, compared the pros and cons of various models, developed the top ones further, tested them against the principles we defined, and this is what we got."

  Chris Disspain: (05:56) yup

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (05:58) Agree THomas, all we are doing here is really recording arious opinoins.

  wolfgang: (05:58) @Thomas: Very fair

  Greg Shatan (GNSO/CSG/IPC): (05:58) I don't think a review of pros and cons precludes a review of principles, or vice versa.

  Jordan Carter: (05:59) We already agreed we have to do the principles test, but Thomas's suggestion that we come to a finalised set of testing principles / criteria is sensible - except, have we not already done that?

  Brenden Kuerbis: (05:59) Thomas, fair point, but we are still struggling with fundamental differences in approach to transition. But of course, at end of day we will have a digestable and defendable proposal.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (05:59) I would see it ad worthy preamble to just that @greg.  yes

  Jordan Carter: (05:59) Related question: are the model/s yet well enough developed to do what is suggested?

  Jordan Carter: (06:00) I assumed this process is helping clarifying and refining the models

  Jordan Carter: (06:00) to then basically do what Thomas suggests

  Brenden Kuerbis: (06:00) Agree Jordan

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:01) we are applying a triage ATM...

  Guru Acharya: (06:01) The process of approval should be considered different from the process of proposal development. In this stage of proposal development, everyone including NTIA is partcipating at an equal footing. The views of NTIA should not get special preference at this stage. I again urge that the this pro be deleted.

  Brenden Kuerbis: (06:01) Agree with Guru on this

  Wale Bakare: (06:03) Break last till?

  Jordan Carter: (06:03) one hour

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:03) 1 h break

  Wale Bakare: (06:03) Thanks