Attendees: 

Members:    Alan Greenberg, Becky Burr, Bruce Tonkin, Cheryl Langdon-Orr, Fiona Asonga, Izumi Okutani, Jordan Carter, Jorge Villa, Julia Wolman, Julie Hammer, Leon Sanchez, Lyman Chapin, Mathieu Weill, Olga Cavalli,  Pär Brumark, Robin Gross, Samantha Eisner, Sébastien Bachollet, Steve DelBianco, Suzanne Radell, Thomas Rickert, Tijani Ben Jemaa   (22)

Participants:  Alissa Cooper, Allan MacGillivray, Andrew Harris, Andrew Sullivan, Anne Aikman-Scalese, Avri Doria, Barrack Otieno, Brett Schaefer, Cherine Chalaby, Chris Disspain, Christopher Wilkinson, David McAuley, Edward Morris, Eric Brunner-Williams, Erika Mann, Farzaneh Badii, Finn Petersen, Greg Shatan, Harold Arcos, Jeff Neuman, Jonathan Zuck, Jorge Cancio, Kavouss Arasteh, Keith Drazek, Malcolm Hutty, Markus Kummer, Mary Uduma, Matthew Shears, Megan Richards, Mike Chartier, Milton Mueller, Niels ten Oever, Paul Szyndler, Pedro Ivo Silva, Phil Buckingham, Philip Corwin, Tatiana Tropina, Tom Dale, Tracy Hackshaw   (39)

Legal Counsel:  Holly Gregory, Michael Clark, Nancy McGlamery, Stephanie Petit, Steven Chiodini   (5)

Staff:  Alain Durand, Alice Jansen, Bernie Turcotte, Berry Cobb, Brenda Brewer, Hillary Jett, Karen Mulberry, Nigel Hickson, Tarek, Kamel, Theresa Swinehart, Trang Nguyen Xavier Calvez, Yuko Green

Apologies:  Martin Boyle, Mark Carvell, Eberhard Lisse

**Please let Brenda know if your name has been left off the list (attendees or apologies).**

Transcript

Recording

• The Adobe Connect recording is available here: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p3064gr9g8h/

• The audio recording is available here:   http://audio.icann.org/accountability/ccwg-accountability-07jan16-en.mp3

Agenda

Notes

These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript.

1. Welcome, Roll-Call, SoI TR (2 min)

• No one on dial only - no changes to SOI.

2. Recommendation 1 - Inspection rights MW (45 min)

See: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-    community/2016-January/009306.html

• MWeill - ICANN concern this could consume extraordinary amount of resources. We have also received a memo from the lawyers on this topic - relevant extracts have been included in the above noted document. Firstly scope and limitation of inspection rights. Secondly criteria for deciding to use the inspection - Sole Designator. Thirdly which is not related to inspection is the admissibility of the GAC to the Empowered community.

• MWeill - Our lawyers have advised as to which documents inspection rights apply to. These could be included in our report and could address some of the concerns from the Board. Are there any issues with this regarding the scope and limitation. Support in the chat.

• BTonkin - requirement for more clarity given the basic accounting GL information would not be helpful. In trying to provide additional information to be useful but needs to be framed so it is not unlimited.

• MWeill - Adding recommendations from the lawyers would seem to meet some of the requirements.

• BTonkin - need to look at this not from the POV of a California court but rather from an IRP panel - needs to definition of terms. Best approach may be for the Board to provide some suggested red-line text to be clear.

• MWeill - Second issue - Thresholds for making a request - The third draft proposed that the SD would submit a request requested by a single SOAC. Board requested standard support level similar to the thresholds for other powers.

• JCarter - The lawyers position seemed more reasonably which did not require a high threshold vs what the Board require.

• AGreenberg - Answer to this depends on what there is a right to request - so the two issues are related. My position is between the Board and JC's position. It is not reasonable, personal opinion, allowing a single SOAC to request. Cal law is clear that this should not be for business interests. Would need at least 2 SOACs to approve. Board is overreacting but the current proposal is overly liberal and open to abuse.

• JCarter - supports lawyers position on principal. This is not really a power, it is the result of the compromise for moving away from membership. Disagree with AG that this will be abused by the gNSO given their internal processes.

• EMorris - Agree with JC. Need to keep things simple so it can be used and not allow it to be twisted by the Board or staff to delay or block requests. Similarly for who can make a request. DIDP request example. Making it too complicated is not useful.

• MWeill - comment by Holly - Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): if requested information is reasonable related to a community power or right, Alan's concern about improper use of inspection rights to obtain commercial information is addressed

• GShattan - Follow on Holly - AG's concerns may be misreading counsel comments on this. gNSO is not made up of single intent group. Gaining commercial advantage via this information should not be allowed.

• MWeill - space is already pretty narrow.

• CChelaby - Board sees it as a community power vs a designator power. As such using the standard thresholds would make sense. On fraud or mismanagement a third party could be hired to make the determination if there was fraud or mismanagement.

• MWeill - The proposed investigation power proposed by the Board is good and should be noted in our proposal. CC are things clear.

• CChelaby - heard but it does not seem that the standard thresholds should apply.

• BTonkin - The example EM gave was instructive. Accounts will tell you how much we paid a supplier vs a document inspection right which could show if a contractor has met the requirements of the contract. So standard financial records it could be ok to have a single SO or AC. For anything more complex a higher threshold.

• MWeill - This sounds like an interesting way forward.

• HJGregory - interpretation of our advice has been correct. There may be confusion on what is covered by inspection rights which does not cover investigations. We were simply trying to match what members would be allowed under Cal. law.

• KArasteh - (no sound)

• MWeill - different levels of requests would require different approval.

• SDBianco - discussion of sole member vs sole designator - thresholds would of applied to the sole member so this is consistent. If we had a sole member we would be having the same discussion.

• MWeill - will update the document to reflect low thresholds for accounting records and then include higher thresholds for investigations and include restrictions for vexatious or frivolous request in implementation should be allowed to be dismissed.

• MWeill - not allowing the GAC to be a decisional member. Until we receive formal GAC input on this we should not discuss this at this point but rather once GAC input has been received.

• RGross - Caution if we have before NTIA and Congress if we present a proposal with the GAC being a decisional participant. which could undermine the transition. Also consider rec. 11.

• MWeill - This discussion will be taken up at a later meeting.

• KArasteh - We must wait for the GAC to take a position. There is a big difference bet rec. 1 and rec. 11.

• MWeill - The inspection rights are as discussed here. DIDP is not a community power and is available to all. This concludes this section.

3. Recommandation 2 - Escalation timeframe LS (45 min)

See: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009307.html

Discussion points:

• Notice and opportunity to comply extend periods

• Extension of deadlines

• Empowerment of Councils or Charis for the initial steps

• Removal of certain process steps (simplification)

• JCarter - 15 day deadlines originally proposed with few steps. Dublin increased the number of steps substantially. Keeping deadlines short may not allow the use of such powers. Overextending the timelines may imply its too long to be of any use. The proposal in the document offers 4 options as noted above. Having examined these it seems that merging the conf. call and forum steps and extend deadlines. This could allow for extending timelines to 30 days.

• LSanchez - Opens to questions and comments

• AGreenberg - Empowerment of councils in unclear. Re merging the levels no major issues except, need to specify reasonable processes to socialize the intent to use a power.

• LSanchez - way forward is to include a requirement to socialize any proposed use of a power in the next draft. We could also include JC's proposal for discussion in the next call.

• LSaanchez - ALAC objection to threshold adjustment proposal - AG should present.

• AGreenberg - Clarification objected only for the Board removal. ALAC was ok for approving changes to fundamental Bylaws. Board removal is as revolutionary as you can get. It generates issues which make no sense especially if it allows 3 SOACs to remove the Board.

• TBenJemaa - Removing the Board is dramatic - and there is no need to reduce the threshold. 3 is not acceptable. Also for other powers. The reduction proposal is not acceptable. Original version was better.

• ASullivan - concerned trying to apply a 3 value system to a 2 value decisions system. I do not care how this works out - if people can abstain then you have to adjust accordingly.

• JCarter - The scenario that gave rise to this was not an abstention - the issue was trying to deal with an SOAC that cannot decide (but we have not defined what counts as an abstention vs not participating). In this case it ends up requiring unanimity for using a power which is against the base principles of the CCWG.

• SDelBianco - explanation from Dublin, need strong support in absence of clear objections. SOACs have 4 options, support, against, abstain or just communicate to the community.

• AGreenberg - RE JC comment - we should not psychoanalyze SOAC if they have no answer. Similar comment. Unrealistic that if someone says no they could enable the action to go forward.

• JCancio - unfortunate we are discussing the participation of the GAC. Remind everyone this is about the exercise of community power and this is only sensible if supported by the community at large - so lowering thresholds is not good and would undermine this exercise.

• MWeill - Useful debate - threshold on fundamental bylaws could paralyze the company, and it is special because it is special given it is an approval vs a veto. We could simply lower fundamental bylaw approval thresholds. this could be a way forward.

• TBenJemaa - are we reconsidering the Dublin? this should not happen. Abstention is participation. Thresholds have to be kept as per Dublin.

• Seun - Supports TBJ and give rationale - we have recall to SOACs have their own processes to reach agreement. We should avoid reducing thresholds and am in favour of unanimity to remove the entire Board. Fundamental Bylaw is critical and threshold should not be reduced. Participation by GAC - why is this still an issue.

• LSanchez - going forward co-chairs will redraft with the proposed amendments by MW and test this on the list to understand if this is acceptable to the CCWG.

• LSanchez - Board suggestion regarding the changing of the number of SOACs.

• BTonkin - The concept is that ICANN may involve in the future - as such it would be prevent uncertainty.

• AGreenberg - I have distributed a chart showing the Board proposal if there is a decrease will not work. Adding units may really depend on circumstances. We should not cast in concrete needs to be a case by case, it should be a guideline.

• JCarter - Agree with AG. We will have to consider anyways given adding a new SOAC will require a change of Bylaws.

• TBenJemma - agree with AG but also agree with Board that it has to evolve with the changes.

• LSanchez - co-chairs will draft recommendation based on the discussion and circulate to consideration by the CCWG.

• SdelBianco - in considering adding SOAC implies a change in Bylaws but a change of thresholds are a fundamental bylaw and require approval by the the Designator.

• Lsanchez - reasonable and to be taken into account at time of drafting.

• LSanchez - Is this approach in line with the concerns of the Board?

• BTonkin - will consider the written text early next week.

• LSanchez - concern of = weight between SO and ACs. Still waiting on input from gNSO on this - as such would recommend this be a pending issue and discuss it when the gNSO input is recieved so all comments can be concerned.

• LSanchez - this concludes this section and we can go to the Break.

Post break notes.

4. Recommendation 4 - Budget (IANA) TR (45 min)

See: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009308.html

TRickert - subjects:

• Trickert -  On the first point, this was included in the second draft but unfortunately not carried over to the third draft. As such we propose to simply re-introduce the text from the second version.

• Seeing no objection this will be carried forward.

• TRickert - On the second point - IANA Budget Veto. Note from IANA says it does not wish to participate in a Budget veto. (reads suggested text in the above document).

• AGreenberg - Comment, should the IANA budget be vetoed it is of concern to all of the community and not just the operational community. As such do not agree with the Board recommendation.

• IOkutani - The ASO believes the third version of the CCWG proposal meets the needs of the ASO. The fees are adequately addressed by the SLA bet. ICANN and the ASO. This element of the proposal should not block the transition.

• JCarter - originally thought this was useful comment by the Board. In WP1 this was not of interest. Also the IAB and ASO positions it would seem the third draft would be acceptable. Agree with AG.

• ASullivan - uncomfortable with para. 22. The relationship bet the IETF and ICANN is managed by the IAB on the IETF side and the IAB does not want to participate in budget discussions because they have an SLA for services. The IAB suggested a different approach in the second draft - that the budget of the IANA operation be frozen over a fixed period. For us this is a straightforward supplier service agreement.

• TRickert - AS how can we reword to satisfy the IAB.

• ASullivan - need to to consider contractual commitments.

• CChelaby - Board perspective - the idea agrees with the work on the budget - but IANA is a service to customers so it made sense to have those communities oversee this. Takes note of AG comments. Comfortable with proposal para 22 and removing IETF/IAB.

• KArasteh - the only non-SO is IETF - other communities must be involved beyond the operational communities

• BTonkin - The last sentence is the key and may have to improved. Have to understand how the caretaker budget functions. Elaborating further that allows it to deliver on its contracts and SLAs and services for the security and stability of the Internet.

• TRickert - the essence of para 22 seems ok but needs some finessing as per the discussion above. The next draft should go to the mailing list.

• TRickert - Thrid point - caretaker budget - more details in the proposal or leave it to implementation? JC to provide background.

• JCarter - not much to add. there has been good discussions and the principles are solid. There is not much difference between the options. No view on either option. JZ?

• JZuck - principles are mostly agreeable for the community. Agree with JC much of this is going to be technical and such be left to implementation.

• TRickert - we are doing the third question under budget.

• CLangdon-Orr - for those not involved in CWG work, there is DT0 which is working on the caretaker budget. Leave the details to implementation - which the CWG is currently working on.

• CChelaby - Agree with JZ, and the proposal, caretaker budget should be part of the fundamental bylaw which was included in the Board comments.

• JZuck - need to not have too many details in the bylaws. but high level is fine.

• CChelaby - makes sense.

• TRickert - it seems clear this is fit for implementation with the amendments as per the above discussion.

• TRickert - 4th point - Fundamental vs standard bylaw - Strong wish from the Board for fundamental. Also CWG requirement makes this a requirement for a fundamental bylaw. Additionally this has always been presented as a fundamental bylaw. As such it would not seem advisable to make it a standard bylaw. Would like to hear from those wanting a standard bylaw.

• AGreenberg - changing now does not seem wise.

• Trickert - this would close this section.

5. Recommendation 5 – Mission MW (45 min)  refer to public comment summary -

Presentation: https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/iRHTBQ

Deck Meeting #75 MIssion Statement

• MWeill - I will hand it over to Becky to deliver her presentation.

• BBurr - presentation of the slides - Straw men/persons:

• GAC Advice, PICs, Contract Provisions: Questions

• In what way does/should ICANN’s Mission Statement constrain the Board’s ability to comply with GAC Advice?

• Proposition:  The GAC may provide Advice on any matter it sees fit; ICANN must duly consider such Advice in accordance with the Bylaws, and if it decides to follow such Advice, must do so in a manner consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws, including its Mission Statement.

• How does/should the Mission Statement limit the permissible scope of ICANN’s agreements with contracted parties?

• Proposition:  ICANN’s agreements with contracted parties may reflect:           (a)  bottom-up, consensus-based, multistakeholder policies on issues for which uniform or coordinated resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate the openness, interoperability, resilience, security and/or stability of the DNS; and (b) other provisions in service of that Mission.

• GAC Advice, PICs, Contract Provisions: Questions

• Who should be able to challenge whether or not a contract provision is in “service of” that Mission, and under what circumstances?

• To what extent should contracted parties be free to propose or voluntarily accept (and obligated to comply with) contract provisions that exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission, e.g., to serve a specific community, pro-actively address a public policy concern?

• If “voluntary” commitments may exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission, how do you ensure that such commitments are truly voluntary?

• Proposition:  Individually negotiated commitments will be deemed to be voluntary.  Existing RA and RAA language (including standard PICs) are “grandfathered” (as defined in Notes).  Going forward, a mechanism should be available to permit contracted parties to enter into agreements without waiving the right to challenge (collectively) a contract provision on the grounds that (a) it exceeds ICANN’s Mission and (b) was extracted by ICANN on an other than voluntary basis.

• Contracting and Regulatory Prohibition:  Questions

• The ICANN Board asserts that the prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide is “not appropriate for inclusion of the Mission Statement.”  The Board further suggests that the CCWG should direct the Bylaws drafting team to incorporate limitations on the reach of Registry and Registrar contracts in another part of the Bylaws. 

• Where?  GNSO Section?  General Provisions (Article XV)?

• Include challenge mechanism to test voluntariness?

• Impact of this change?

• KArasteh - Did the GAC identify any limitation of    ICANN accepting GAC advice. Suggest there should be language to accept requirements of GAC. Second question ICANN Board proposes mission should be precise and concise - rest should go to scope etc. - is there a proposal how to do this.

• BTonkin - Board did not object on GPI - Board has simply stated they will need to consider GPI if their concerns are not addressed. Also yes we need a specific mission. gTLD specific issues should probably be in the gNSO. The other parts can be included in the respective parts.

• AGreenberg - on consumer trust - AOC text on this is only an interpretation, and ALAC feels this is important. Much of the policies should be bottom up vs invalidating PICS which are not bottom up. RE Picket Fence - policies have certain qualities - and have to remove these from the mission.

• BBurr - no one is thinking of specs 1 and 4 should be in the mission - they are only notes for drafting. Current text provides a handle to address the non-bottom up concern of AG.

• MMueller - the current mission has had consensus for the three rounds. We are not discussing if the mission is narrow and limited but rather talking about how best to do this and we cannot move away from this without risking consensus on everything. Agree with implication of BB analysis. GAC concern re advice Do GAC believe there should be no mission limitations? GAC advice against mission vs new TLDs would be an involuntary criterion.

• MWeill - have to close.

• MHutty - Agree with BB and Milton. One problem vs voluntary commitments. We need to work things we can get through and not worry about the things we will not.

• JCancio - (GAC Switzerland): @staff Please include this on the notes as probably I won't have time to speak: jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): Dear all: I feel for policy maker what the GAC and others are seeking is quite simple, which is an impact assessment of the proposed changes. This is current practice and should be acceptable without any doubt. In the GACs input a series of elements are identified which should be part of that impact assessment. Otherwise we have no clarity at all and no objective and neutral assessment at hand which would allow us to determine whether the proposed changes (which have been subject to last minute changes for a long time) outlaw certain important instruments which are available now, such as the PICs

• MWeill - need to keep working on this complex issues. BB should take up the discussions.

6. AOB LS (3 min)

• Friday CCWG meeting prior to ICANN 55 Maraketch is confirmed

Adjourned.

Action Items

Documents

Adobe Chat

  Brenda Brewer: (1/7/2016 12:24) Welcome to CCWG Accountability Meeting #75 on 7 January 2016 @ 19:00 UTC!  Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards 

  Brenda Brewer: (12:50) Hi Jonathan!

  Brenda Brewer: (12:50) Audio works!

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (12:51) Always feel like i need to check. Thanks Brenda!

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (12:52) hI Brenda

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (12:52) Hi evry body

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (12:57) hello everyone

  Becky Burr: (12:58) good day all

  andrew sullivan: (12:59) hi everyone

  Olga Cavalli - GAC Argentina: (12:59) Hi all!

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (12:59) hi

  cherine chalaby: (13:00) Hi Everyone

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:00) hi all

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:00) Hello everyone!  just a note that we have provided comments an Annexes 1, 2, 4 and 12 to staff and co-chairs for posting today. 

  Konstantinos Komaitis: (13:00) hi everyone

  Erika Mann: (13:00) Can't hear a tone ....

  nigel hickson: (13:00) good evening

  Pär Brumark (GAC Niue): (13:00) Hi all!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:00) hi al

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:01) *all

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:01) Hello all

  FIONA ASONGA (ASO): (13:01) Hallo All

  Markus Kummer: (13:01) Hi everyone

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:01) Hi

  Sébastien (ALAC): (13:01) Echo

  Alice Jansen: (13:01) Please mute your line if not speaking

  Keith Drazek: (13:01) Getting a bit of an echo. Mute please.

  Olga Cavalli - GAC Argentina: (13:01) thre is an echo...

  Tatiana Tropina: (13:02) Hi everyone

  Gangesh Varma: (13:02) Hello everyone

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:03) it's ok now

  Alan Greenberg: (13:03) Echo ok now from here.

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:03) Echo has gone

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:03) Hello everyone

  Greg Shatan: (13:03) Hello, all.

  Niels ten Oever: (13:04) Hi all

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:04) Greetings from San Francisco!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:05) I have terrible connectivity, apologies in advance if I d

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:06) drop off

  Philip Corwin: (13:06) Complying with inspection righst shoulkd be viewed by the Board as part of operating normally

  Alice Jansen: (13:06) The discussion document are available on this page https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/acctcrosscomm/pages/97719007/Final+Report

  ebw: (13:07) agree with phil, inspection is a continuous right, not exceptional, so part oə normal operations.

  Edward Morris: (13:08) +1 Phil. AS you know Inspection Rights are a statutorily required part of the governance of one type of California PBC. They are not extraordinary.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:09) Agreed.  I do not support the board's mitigation of inspection rights.

  Edward Morris: (13:09) Fully support Mathieu

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:09) I'm a bit astonished about this formulation: "Thridly which is not related to inspection is the admissibility of the GAC to the Empowered community."

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:09) May we ask Bruce to comment

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:09) On scope, I find the language in paragraph 21 on page 5 a bit unclear, specifically the phrase that inspections will be to records and minutes “that are related to the exercise of Community Powers”

  Edward Morris: (13:10) +1 David. I also have that problem, which is part of the Board's proposal.

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:10) Hello, sorry I'm late

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:10) The sound quality is poor

  Erika Mann: (13:10) Chris, Markus and myself - Erika- are on the call as well

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:10) 6333.  The accounting books and records and minutes of proceedings of the members and the board and committees of the board shall be open to inspection upon the written demand  on the corporation of any member at any reasonable time, for a purpose reasonably related to such person's interests as a member.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:10) David, I read that a huge elimination of the rights.  We always say that these powers we are creating are such that we rarely use.  so we rarely have inspection rights under board's formulation.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:11) A lot of this could be eliminated if transcripts of the Board meetings are made publicly availablwe

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:11) available

  Brett Schaefer: (13:11) Agree David, it should be records, minutes and other  materials consistant with Califonia Corporations Code 6333

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:12) Mathieu perhaps better to say "participation of GAC" rather than admissibility when addressing this issue later

  Erika Mann: (13:12) I just can't talk. I'm at a location where people could hear me.

  ebw: (13:12) @bruce, the ledger package is "brightlines"?

  Becky Burr: (13:12) @Jorge - what document are you referring to?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:12) Jeff, there are calls for a WS2 issue of "transparency in board deliberations".  Hopefully that will get in.

  Milton Mueller: (13:12) Erika: think of it as broadening participation in ICANN!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:13) Milton: who would wish that on anyone?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:13) WHICH TERMS?

  Milton Mueller: (13:13) I have a few people i would wish that on....

  Erika Mann: (13:13) Good point Milton ...

  Milton Mueller: (13:14) Jordan made a better point ;-)

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:14) i CAN HRADLY GRASP WHAT bRUCE IS SAYING THE QUALITY IS POOR

  Milton Mueller: (13:14) Kavouss, I think your caps lock is on

  Avri Doria: (13:14) Did the Board take the legal memo into account in deciding that what we had was inadequate?

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:15) +1 Avri

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:15) Could VBruce explain why there is a need to have two SO/AC

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:16) to be consistent with our other power thresholds, we should also say "and no more than one AC/SO objecting" right?

  Chris Disspain: (13:16) that makes sense Steve

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:16) +1 Steve

  Milton Mueller: (13:17) Inspection right should not require consensus across SO/ACs. That's absurd

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:17) i am back on the call

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:17) There is difference between asking inspection and excersing other power

  Milton Mueller: (13:17) YEs, Kavouss is right

  Matthew Shears: (13:17) agree

  Avri Doria: (13:17) One SOAC requesting should be enough.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:18) I see a point in what Milton and others say

  Brett Schaefer: (13:18) +1 Avri

  Avri Doria: (13:18) If transparency is our default postion, then it should not be overly difficult to get documentation that has not yet been released.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:18) Could we ask Bruce to explain what is the problem if only one SO/AC asks for inspection? a

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:19) The inspection rights are "preventative" - the transparency prevents bad things from happening.  The other powers tend to be "reactionary" to something that has been done.  So only one SO or AC should be able to have inspection rights.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:19) I completely disagree with Alan and do not like the suggestion that the GNSO is controlled by the registries

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:19) indeed. if inspection becomes "frivolous or excessive" that is another issue but seems to be a basic right as per the sidled assessment

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:19) why ? why do we need 2 SOAC ? to make it more difficult?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:19) What is their logic for their proposal . Inspection is a fundamental rights and one SO/AC seems to be more than sufficient

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:19) +1 Jordan

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:19) sorry sidled = Sidley

  Avri Doria: (13:19) This is a power but part of the attmept to achive adequate transparency

  Greg Shatan: (13:19) +1 Jeff.

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:20) Alan's clam that SOs are controlled by "specific business interests" is quite wrong, and an unwarranted attack on the inclusive multistakeholder nature of the gNSO

  Avri Doria: (13:20) this is not really a pwoer but ...

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:20) +1 Malcolm

  Milton Mueller: (13:20) Getting an entire SO to agree to request something is not exactly easy

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:20) +1 Jordan

  Alan Greenberg: (13:20) @Jeff, I did not say it was controlled by registries. I said it was almost controlled by contracted parties, and of course that depends on what voting thresholds are used for the SO to make the decision.

  Matthew Shears: (13:20) + 1 Jordan

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:20) if requested information is reasonable related to a community power or right, Alan's concern about improper use of inspection rights to obtain commercial information is addressed

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:20) Someone forgot to tell me that I was controlled by contracting parties! ;-)

  Brett Schaefer: (13:21) +1 Jordan

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:21) I agree with Holly.  I am not sure how requesting an accounting or the books and records could be used for a commercial advantage

  Alan Greenberg: (13:21) @Holly, yes, I said it does depend on exactly what we have inspection rights to.

  Milton Mueller: (13:21) Yes, Alan's persistently repeated view that GNSO = registries and registrars is factually wrong if not bordering on offensive

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:21) Just look at all the DIDP requests that are denied

  Avri Doria: (13:22) well, 3 our of 4 SGs are commercial

  Avri Doria: (13:22) 3 out of 4

  Milton Mueller: (13:22) But 2 are not supply-industry

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:23) and the idea that ccTLD registries are all businesses doesn't quite match the diversity I see in the ccNSO

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:23) Mathieu

  Avri Doria: (13:23) And a decsion can be taken n the GNSO which has not non commercial support.  Stil i think that one SAC is sufficinet, i just don't think seeing the GNSO as predominantly commercial is such an offensive thing to perceive.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:23) The quality of sound is poor

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:23) Using the most general definition of "commercial"  I could argue that part of the NCSG (NPOC) also engages in commercial activity :)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:23) I keep losing AC room connection every five minutes or so :(

  Philip Corwin: (13:23) +1 Ed

  Avri Doria: (13:23) Jeff, that would only strengthen Alan's point

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:24) Agree with Ed.

  Brenda Brewer: (13:24) Kavouss, the sound quality is quite fine.  Would you like for us to call you again?

  Alan Greenberg: (13:24) @Milton, my comment today is substantially different from others I have made in the past. In the past, I have said that contracted parties have an effective veto to stop the Council from doing something, and that is factually correct. In this case we are talking about TAKING action, and that will depend on how the vote to exercise that power is structured - something that has not been addressed by the GNSO as far as I understand.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:24) +1 Ed

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:24) @Avri, the point I was making is that if the request is related to exercizing a comminty power, it does not rise to the definition of "commercial" in the California Code

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:24) May we categorize the inspection based on their scope and  then for some having one SO/ac AND FOR OTHERS 2 So/AC

  Avri Doria: (13:25) Jeff, we are discussing what works for ICANN, not what is technically defined in the California code.

  Alan Greenberg: (13:25) For the record, I was referring to commercial activities where ICANN is one of the parties in a transaction.

  Milton Mueller: (13:25) Alan: Noncontracted parties also have a veto power to prevent GNSO from doing anything.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:26) @Milton:  correct

  Alan Greenberg: (13:26) @Milton, yes they do under today's voting rules, IF they act in concert.

  Keith Drazek: (13:27) Is providing travel funding a commercial activity? Are the recipients involved commercially with ICANN?

  Greg Shatan: (13:27) We'll try to do more of that Alan, where we can.... :-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:27) but Cherine, the whole point is that it should have a lower threshold because it is a precursor

  Milton Mueller: (13:27) whatever, Alamn I really don't see the discussion of GNSO related to inspection powers. If an entire SO or AC wants to inspect, they should be able to do so, that is what we are discussing now

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:27) Mathieu, are you saying that we have only two cetegories of inspection`?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:27) it should not be the same route and should not logically have the same threshold, given your own argument that it's a precursor to using one of the main proposed community powers

  ebw: (13:27) aha. as a manifestation of community power the more-than-one rule is sensible.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:27) Yes, scope is limited.

  Edward Morris: (13:28) Requests would be made by the sole designator. The SD, applying community powers, certainly can implement this power by making a request upon the the application of a single SOAC.

  Keith Drazek: (13:28) +1 Jordan

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:28) We should not limit the scope of the inspection rights to ONLY community powers.  That is a signficant narrowing that  has not been shown necessary.

  Edward Morris: (13:28) +1 Robin

  Tatiana Tropina: (13:28) +1 Robin

  Alan Greenberg: (13:28) @Keith, I would not think that funding travel is a commercial activity,  but it is a dandy thing that we might want more information on if we feel it is being abused.

  Greg Shatan: (13:29) Someone is buzzing...

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:29) Are we defining commercial activities now ? oh that would be as hard as GPI. good usage of it can halt everything I believe :)

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:29) Given how narrow and limited these inspection rights are, I'm mystified that the Board wants to constrain them further. I would have thought it would be an easy one to agree, to demonstrate cooperation and good faith, in an attempt to buy good will for their more serious opposition elsewhere

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:30) we don't have to tether them to the community powers but it is clear that that is their most likely use, in my opinion.

  Anne Aikman-Scalese (IPC): (13:30) Agree that inspection may be necessary for one SO/AC to discuss whether it wants to intitate a development of consensus of exercise of a power.

  Milton Mueller: (13:30) of course, Jordan

  Milton Mueller: (13:30) but it could also be used in connection with general accountability concerns

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:30) and Cherine's logic actually leads you to saying it should have a lower threshold.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:31) It really is simply an implementation issue to prevent vexatious overuse.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:31) Mathieu

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:31) the inspection rights are for transparency so bad things don't happen.  They are in no way tied to community powers.  There isn't a logical connection to that proposal to narrow them.

  Milton Mueller: (13:32) I oppose overuse, especially when it is "vexatious" :-) but getting a request through an entire SO already filters out a lot

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:32) That is in line with my suggestions to gategorise the inspection?

  Keith Drazek: (13:32) 1 Milton

  Keith Drazek: (13:32) +1

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:32) yep

  Brett Schaefer: (13:33) Yes, I also think it would filter out baltant self-interest along comercial lines like Alan is worried about

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:33) Yes Kavouss, adding a new category here following Board comment

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:33) I don't think we should expand these rights to the sort of rights Bruce discussed tbh

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:33) if we want to add them, it's not inspection, it's something new (and as Holly says, good!).

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:34) I am interruped pls read my suggestion on chat

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:34) have we addressed the Board claim that: " Code Section 6333 should not be cited in the Bylaws, as it references inspection of documents related to “interests as a member,” and membership rights and interests do not exist in ICANN. If the reference to membership rights remains, this would leave Independent Review Panels or courts to interpret questions of how California Non-Profit Membership interests might translate into the ICANN Designator model" ?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:35) YES

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:35) Yes Farzaneh, no need to quote this in Bylaws

  Milton Mueller: (13:35) @Keith: 1 Milton, 1 World, 1 Internet ;-)

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:36) Thank you Mathieu

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (13:37) I am sorry for joining late

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:37) yeS i AGREE

  Philip Corwin: (13:37) I am less concerned with rights to see accounting documents than the right to see how ceration contracts are awarded -- especially if it has been done on a sole source, non-competitive basis and appears to have unduly generous terms.

  Edward Morris: (13:37) Sounds good in principle Mathieu

  Philip Corwin: (13:37) certain contracts

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:37) Phil, I am not interested in that at all - surely that's a governance responsibility of the Board and staff?

  Edward Morris: (13:38) I agree with Phil, particularly if there are allegations of malfeasance or impropriety in the award of contracts.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:38) good summary Mathieu, thank you.

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:38) Governance responsibility of a monopoly ? with no one else to hold them accountable ?

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (13:39) + 1 Jordan about the summary. I agree with this suggested approach

  Philip Corwin: (13:39) @Jordan, respectfully disagreeing, what if community believes that a Board decision to award such a contract is suspect

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (13:39) It must be up to the GAC to decide whether the GAC wants to be is a decisional participant in the Community powers. The Danish government thinks that the GAC should not be involved in the decision-making part of the CF.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:39) I full support Mathieuy

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:39) Farzaneh, the whole framework we are building is to hold the Board to account. If it doesn't govern ICANN properly it should be removed.

  Chris Disspain: (13:39) what Jordan is talking about is inspection rights...Phil and Ed are talking about doc disclosure which is a different thing IMO

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:40) Agree with Jordan. 

  Matthew Shears: (13:40) It would be good to hear from the GAC sooner than later on this matter

  Chris Disspain: (13:40) the inspection rights piece is intended to be as per the rights of a member

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:40) GAC consensus on this issue met no objection....

  Chris Disspain: (13:41) DIDP is a separate discussion

  Milton Mueller: (13:41) GAC consensus in which matter, Jorge?

  Milton Mueller: (13:41) @Chris: inspection does not involve document disclosure?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:41) +1 Chris

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:41) sorry Holly, you agree with Jordan on what aspect?

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:42) GAC consensus on participation in engage and escalation process

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:42) Milton: on participation in the empowered community (see my email on list)

  Milton Mueller: (13:43) " The Danish government thinks that the GAC should not be involved in the decision-making part of the CF." what is CF?

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:43) community forum I guess

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:43) To be fair @Kavouss, when you want to mandate that the Board implement GAC

  Milton Mueller: (13:43) So GAC has agreed not to become part of the Sole Designator?

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:43) From a role perspective the role of the Empowered Community is to hold the Board accountable, not to second-guess board decisions.  From a legal perspective the Board is charged with managing and directing the affairs of ICANN and the goal of the Empowered Community is to hold them accountable in doing so. 

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:43) "Advice", thatis not longer advisory

  Becky Burr: (13:44) i don't think that the GAC has made a formal decision Milton

  Milton Mueller: (13:44) @Becky - I guess I am confused then about what Jorge and Pedro are saying

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:44) But Holly, the community must be able to CHALLENGE a board action IN ORDER TO hold the corportation accountable to the community

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:45) Nice seque Mathieu

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:45) Agree Steve

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:45) segue

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:45) Steve, that is what the community powers are all about

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:45) Thanks, at lelast someone noticed ;-)

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:45) I do not belive it should be up the GAC alone if it is provided with decisional authority.  It should be a community decision, since the community will have to live under it.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:46) it is a community decision - this CCWG has proposed GAC be decisional three times in a row

  Brett Schaefer: (13:46) +1 Robin

  Milton Mueller: (13:46) Jordan, if you consider 1/4 of the CCWG to be irrelevant, that is true

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:46) Jordan, what I am saying is that it needs to be reconsidered. 

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:46) I don't consider that irrelvant, but 1/4 don't beat 3/4

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:47) We may reconsider reviewing the deadliones but we should not increase or decrease any deadline in isolation from the other, in other words we should havean overall review of time line

  Milton Mueller: (13:47) So don't speak for "this CCWG" just come out and say "we have more votes than you and are choosing to not pursue consensus

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:47) Leon

  Thomas: (13:47) Empowering the community (the whole community including the GAC) has enjoyed overwhelming support in our previous reports. Let's not reopen that discussion, please. We are talking about limited community powers.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:47) i said, the CCWG put it in its reports. I am clearly not a spokesperson for the ccwg

  Milton Mueller: (13:48) Further, it's not clear how much of the CCWG actually SUPPORTS that, only that some of them think GAC will vote against the solution if they don't go along with it

  Thomas: (13:48) Sorry, I only typed in my first name. Thomas Rickert that is.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:48)  ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS the Board's suggestion to change the weighting threshold ,See their comments on Rec. 2

  Becky Burr: (13:48) I thought that our recommendation permitted the GAC to participate in a decisional mode, but I don't think the 3 drafts can fairly be read as recommending GAC participation as a decision-maker.  rather, that decision was left to GAC

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:48) And the decision was taken in opposition to public comment.  Straw polls of mostly GAC members should not be allowed to get proposals into our draft.  That is not the way the charter works.  Members are supposed to polled on such issues, not the masses on any particular call.  We made a mistake and we need to fix it before it is too date.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:49) Jordan, the GAC has not even decided that 

  Matthew Shears: (13:49) agree Becky

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:49) too "late", rather.

  Milton Mueller: (13:49) @ Becky: and I am still confused about what the GAC is choosing to do

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:49) Jordan + 1

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (13:49) Yes Kavouss, we will try to disscuss all 4 points of discussion

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:49) Milton: here is the GAC consensus input from 21 december on this issue: http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-draft-ccwg-accountability-proposal-30nov15/msg00070.html

  Becky Burr: (13:49) ok Milton, reread Jorge's comments and I am confused as well

  Edward Morris: (13:49) +1 Milton. The difference in private conversation and public position on GAC participation is quite stunning.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:49) agreed with no formal objection of course :-)

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:50) one day GAC will decide that they want to participate, and then we ought to say oh ofcourse you can participate whenever you want

  Milton Mueller: (13:50) thanks, Jorge

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:50) Milton, do not confused. you need to allow GAC to make its comment

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:50) and here is the relevant text: Establishing an empowered community for enforcing community powers(RECOMMENDATION 1)The GAC anticipates that it intends to participate in the proposed communitymechanism with the following qualifications.The GAC would focus on participation in the processes of engagement andescalation detailed in Recommendation 2 with a view to supporting dialogue andmutual understanding that would lead to resolution of disputes rather thanescalation.GAC participation would be primarily guided by a careful and prudent analysis ofwhether the issue under consideration has public policy and/or legal implications.The GAC’s participation at the enforcement stage as appropriate is still underdiscussion.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:50) Milton, this is the GAC comment on EC participation: The GAC anticipates that it intends to participate in the proposed communitymechanism with the following qualifications.The GAC would focus on participation in the processes of engagement andescalation detailed in Recommendation 2 with a view to supporting dialogue andmutual understanding that would lead to resolution of disputes rather thanescalation.GAC participation would be primarily guided by a careful and prudent analysis ofwhether the issue under consideration has public policy and/or legal implications.The GAC’s participation at the enforcement stage as appropriate is still underdiscussion.

  Becky Burr: (13:51) so if it participates in the escalation process, isn't that participating as a decision maker?

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:51) The GAC input is clear about GAC willing to participate in engagement and escalation processes as indicated in the 3rd draft report...

  Milton Mueller: (13:51) My point exactly

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:51) which includes the decisional step as well...right, Becky

  Alan Greenberg: (13:52) Question on meaning.What does "empowerment of Councils" mean. Aren't the Councils (or committees) the only entity with power already, regardless of their internal rules for making decisions?