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All comments can be found at http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/
| Agreements | ICANN's accountability should be defined in terms of transparent agreements with ICANN stakeholders, defining roles, responsibilities, dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms | NRO |
| Agreements | The service agreements for delivery of service to the RIRs should be reviewed to define appropriate dispute resolution, escalation and arbitration procedures | NRO |
| AoC | Previous recommendations from ATRTs should be implemented in a timely fashion | Robin Gross |
| AoC | The AoC is not an accountability mechanism and tinkering with it will not produce accountability improvements | Milton Mueller |
| Audit | Require annual outside audit of ICANN, performed by an entity without preexisting contract | Heritage Foundation |
| Board | At least 1/3 of Board members to devote full time to ICANN, to be "better equipped to assist the Board in reaching rightful decisions" | Spain |
| Board | Broadcast Board meetings over internet and archive Board materials | Heritage Foundation |
| Board | Create a mechanism by which the Chair of the Board could be voted off by a defined supermajority in the SOs and Acs | Avri Doria |
| Board | Create a mechanism by which the entire Board could be voted off | Avri Doria |
| Board | Create a recall mechanism for any elected Board member by the entity that selected them | Avri Doria |
| Board | Enhanced accountability process should include consideration of significant alterations of the Board's composition and functions, with accompanying changes to the Bylaws | INTA |
| Board | GAC to select two to four voting members of the Board that are not officials in any government, people for whom the GAC respects experience in managing public policy issues | Spain |
| Board | Increase Observer Status Board seats (potentially selected by NomCom) (non-voting) | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Board | Make Board and committee discussions archived for transparency, with limited redaction | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Board | Make Board deliberations transparent through a non-ceremonial open meeting at ICANN's public meeting | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Board | No ICANN officer or voting director should be selected by or represent a governmental or intergovernmental body | Heritage Foundation |
| Board | Provide demonstrable links of Board members residence, studies and careers in the country | Spain |
| Board | Provide means for the public to engage in questions and answers with the ICANN Board, such as convening annually at the IGG | SIIA |
| Board | Simplify Board selection process to one that is more transparent and direct (with proposals suggested) | Heritage Foundation |
| Change AoC | A review of the AoC would be timely; the cornerstone commitment of ICANN to remain a not-for-profit corporation headquartered in the United States and organized under U.S. law must be strengthened | COA |
| Change AoC | ATRT members should have open access to all ICANN internal documentation and be empowered to recommend declassification; embargoed information should have a clear timeline for release | Avri Doria |
| Change AoC | ATRT should be given the authority to sunset obsolete reviews and create new reviews as it sees fit | BC (Reply) |
| Change AoC | Board to have no control on selections to review teams | Spain |
| Change AoC | Broaden the basis of the AoC through additional MoUs, including democratic governments and global INGOs | Avri Doria |
| Change AoC | Change the AoC membership to be balanced among the ICANN community by implementation of a formula, allow selection of members to be at the discretion of the respective SOs and ACs; invite a past chair or member of each other AoC review team to be an observer to the next ATRT review; experts working on AoC review teams should be at the discretion of the review team, not the Board, staff or GAC | Avri Doria |
| Change AOC | Commission expert to examine questions of should additional parties be invited to become parties to AoCs, and what other agreements or impacts should be considered as part of the DNS. Should third parties be able to raise grievances based on failures to follow the AoC, and what mechanisms would be used | |
| Change AoC | Community (including governments) should have chance to suggest external experts for participation | Spain |
| Change AoC | Community should be able to designate representatives on review teams without Board or GAC Chair approval | BC (Reply) |
| Change AoC | Develop standard text to be signed between ICANN and each government, as well as ICANN and each stakeholder group | European Commission |
| Change AoC | Do not enter into multiple bilateral AoCs, as they could be extremely difficult to negotiate and create conflicting obligations | BC (Reply) |
| Change AoC | Evolution of AoC could take the form of an affirmation into which many more stakeholder communities, including Governments, could enter | NRO |
| Change AoC | Existing mechanisms for accountability should be preserved and made legally binding, such as through perpetual extension of the Affirmation of Commitments and the reviews that it sets forth | Verizon |
| Change AoC | Expanding countersignatures on AoC will not satisfy all nations or international bodies | Konrad von Finckenstein |
| Change AoC | Future review teams should have "proper" representation of governments, with no ex-officio governmental members | Spain |
| Change AoC | GAC as a whole, not the Chair, should make selections to the review teams | Spain |
| Change AoC | ICANN to enter into AoC with Internet Freedom Panel, and include terms on freedom of expression (Based upon suggestion that with the anticipated transition, the current AoC will no longer be in effect) | Heritage Foundation |
| Change AoC | If more AoCs are signed, there should be the inclusion of strong redress mechanism in case of failure in compliance of ICANN's duties, to entities external to ICANN | Spain |
| Change AOC | Incorporate redress, appeal and enforcement mechanisms into new AoCs | European Commission |
| Change AoC | Incorporate statement that ICANN endeavors to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles contained in it | Edward Morris |
| Change AoC | Independent experts not enough; conduct assessments through external entities | Spain |
| Change AoC | Make review team recommendations binding on ICANN | European Commission |
| Change AoC | Modify the membership of ATRT for greater organizational parity and for rotating government seats and global INGO seats on the ATRT among the signatories of MoUs | Avri Doria |
| Change AoC | Provide transparency into review team recommendations - what level of consensus was reached on the recommendation? How were community inputs considered? Which inputs were rejected? Etc. | Spain |
| Change AoC | Recommendations of review teams should be given higher priority for implementation; requirement for responding to recommendations should be institutionalized | BC (Reply) |
| Change AoC | Review process should be every 5 years, not 3, so that ICANN is not in a continuous review cycle without time for implementation of changes | Fiona Asonga |
| Change AoC | Termination - adopt Board resolution that AoC is binding and will not terminate without supermajority vote | |
| Change AoC | The ATRT Reviews are the foundation on which other accountability mechanisms should be built | Avri Doria |
| Change AoC | While several values in AoC should be maintained (preserve security, stability and resiliency; promote competition, consumer trust and choice; facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination) but amend to "ensure that ICANN's decisions are fully consistent with human rights standards. ICANN should guarantee that decisions related to the global and technical coordination of the DNS are made in a transparent and accountable manner and crucially 'for the protection and advance of human rights and Internet freedoms' rather than 'in the public interest'" | NCSG |
| Change Articles of Incorporation | ICANN should change its AoI to require accountability to its stakeholder bodies; no further amendments to this section should be allowed | Brian Carpenter |
| Change Bylaws | Allow for dissolution of the Board in exceptional circumstances, consistent with the President's Strategy Committee's draft plan for Improving Institutional Confidence | NCSG |
| Change Bylaws | Bylaws could be amended to reflect the need for the organization to evolve and provide stronger accountability mechanisms to the wider community, such as amended to prohibit ICANN from engaging in regulation of content or conduct in violation of the rights to freedom of expression or privacy. | NCSG |
| Change Bylaws | For changes to key portions of the Bylaws should require maximum public comment period and even higher than 2/3 threshold | |
| Change Bylaws | In the absence of the IANA Functions Contract reviews, the AoC should become a permanent fixture in ICANN's Bylaws (as modified) | BC (Reply) |
| Change Bylaws | Incorporate AoC Commitments into the Bylaws | SIIA |
| Change Bylaws | Incorporate AoC into the Bylaws | Edward Morris |
| Change Bylaws | Incorporate ATRT review into the Bylaws (subject to heightened threshold for change), and broaden to allow the sunsetting or launch of other reviews; also supports continuation of other AoC reviews and inclusion in the Bylaws | USCIB |
| Change Bylaws | Incorporate freedom of expression, discourse and assembly into Bylaws | Heritage Foundation |
| Change Bylaws | Raise threshold for changes to Bylaws provisions essential to ICANN's mission, accountability, transparency, and review to 2/3 | USCIB |
| Change Bylaws | Raise threshold for changes to Bylaws to 2/3 | |
| Change Bylaws | Require 4/5 vote of Board for major decisions (including Bylaws revisions and Articles of Incorporation), as well as for the GNSO | Heritage foundation |
| Change Bylaws | Require higher threshold for changes to Bylaws on Accountability and review | SIIA |
| Change Bylaws | Require supermajority of Board, based on significant community input, to make changes to core obligations in Bylaws | MPAA |
| Change Bylaws | Require supermajority or unanimity to change location of ICANN incorporation or not-for-profit status; also require 2/3 majority vote of ICANN multistakeholder community | USCIB |
| Change Bylaws | Strengthen Bylaws to require a high threshold of support for any proposed change in policy that impacts ICANN's central mission | Verizon |
| Clerk or Parliamentarian | Independent staff position to help guide community through ICANN's complex processes - focus on uniformity/predictability | |
| Complaint mechanisms | Inquiry and complain channels should be established to receive user complaints and suggestions | Internet Society of China |
| Complaint mechanisms | Response mechanisms should be set up to give feedback on each complaint channel and boost the improvement | Internet Society of China |
| Component Entities | All supporting organizations and affiliate organizations to put in place accountability and transparency mechanisms similar or aligned to those of ICANN | Edward Morris |
| Component Entities | Create a recall mechanism for SO Council and ALAC members selected by the NomCom, or the entities that selected them | Avri Doria |
| Component Entities | Have Transparency International conduct an audit of all SOs and Acs | Edward Morris |
| Conflicts of Interest | Potential revenue implications from ICANN proposals should be routinely disclosed | SIIA |
| Consequences | ICANN should be subject to losing control of the contents of the root zone if the relevant stakeholder group is dissatisfied | Brian Carpenter |
| Contracts | ICANN bylaws should prohibit entering of agreements that impose conditions unrelated to DNS management; contracts should not be subject to ICANN unilateral change, and should be subject to US Courts | Heritage Foundation |
| Contractual Compliance | Maintain routine, rigorous reporting on contractual compliance | MPAA |
| Data | ICANN needs to develop good base data (society, economics, infrastructure, etc.) on 200-250 countries and 2.7 billion Internet users | Kilnam Chon |
| DIDP | Accountability body to ensure that community has complete and timely access to all materials relevant to ICANN decision-making process; may request and publish policy documents/brings/memos/emails | MPAA |
| DIDP | Consider holding a public consultation on stakeholder experiences with DIDP | SIIA |
| DIDP | Create independent body to sit in appeal over decisions of production - could be community comprised, but people independent of ICANN | CIS |
| DIDP | Create more robust FOIA type process, potentially through administration by a third party | USCIB |
| DIDP | Exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time bound | CIS |
| DIDP | Explore options for increasing transparency | Edward Morris |
| DIDP | Incorporate a sunset period for information classified as non-discloseable | Edward Morris |
| DIDP | Institute punitive measure for unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of information | CIS |
| DIDP | Make broader and provide appeal through an independent dispute resolution process | Heritage Foundation |
| DIDP | Provide public statistics on how many requests are made and denied | SIIA |
| DIDP | Remove ability to cite "legal disclaimers, confidentiality clauses or NDAs" in requests for information so that ICANN must consider transparency when engaging outside services | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| DIDP | Review Defined Conditions for Nondisclosure to make more information available to stakeholders without constraining operations; include possibility of disclosure of intra-ICANN communications | SIIA |
| DIDP | Strengthen the response and appeal measures, including designated, publicly identified members of staff be responsible for coordination of response | CIS |
| Direct Relationship | ICANN should host pictures from meetings on its own servers, not on services like Flickr or other corporate websites for which participants would have to agree to other terms of service re marketing, etc. | DeeDee Halleck |
| Disclosures | All members of the ICANN Board and others in leadership positions at ICANN should disclose monies earned or other benefit procured as a result of affiliation with ICANN | Edward Morris |
| Diversity | ICANN should consider diversity of opinions and advice brought by global community | Internet Society of China |
| External Supervision | ICANN needs to form a more sufficient and effective external supervision mechanism to develop a credible accountability on policy making and operation | CNNIC |
| Fees | Require supermajority of Board to approve changes in fees | Heritage Foundation |
| Finances | Complete budget of ICANN should be online, including income, travel expenses and consultancies | DeeDee Halleck |
| Finances | ICANN needs to not only describe what it is going to accomplish and note whether it was accomplished, but also "what did it cost and was that cost worth it?" to measure the return on scarce resources | DNA |
| Globalization | ICANN increasing visibility to stakeholders all around the world | Fiona Asonga |
| Globalization | ICANN should exert efforts to further substantiate the full function and working capacity of its globalization efforts | CNNIC |
| Globalization | ICANN's incorporation gives the impression that it is under the control of one single government, which is inconsistent with ICANN's intention to be responsible for global multistakeholders and is an impediment to ICANN's deepening globalization | Internet Society of China |
| Globalization | Promote greater engagement of stakeholders from across the world and outside the ICANN community | European Commission |
| Governance balance | Design ICANN with separation of powers thoughts in mind - Board and executive accountable for the policies and actions of entire organization, community as the collective house/legislature, and reconsideration/ombudsman as more independent internal Judicial Organ | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Governance balance | Modify ICANN's governance structure so that Board members are accountable to external groups, to allow for increased representation of direct users, but don't allow governmental seat | TPI |
| Government Engagement | ICANN maintaining/establishing engagement with all governments whether or not they have been involved with ICANN, welcoming involvement alongside non-governmental stakeholders | Fiona Asonga |
| Human Rights | Accounting for how ICANN's policies impact the basic human rights of Internet users and ongoing mechanisms to ensure ICANN's policies do not circumvent the rights of Internet users should be in place | Robin Gross |
| Implement ATRT Recommendations | Complete implementation of ATRT recommendations | NCSG |
| Implement ATRT Recommendations | The first requirement for improved accountability is the full implementation of the recommendations of the completed current AoC reviews, with current and future work not being used as a reason against open recommendations; items where Board or staff feel a recommendation cannot be implemented should be brought back for further conversation | Avri Doria |
| Inclusiveness | ICANN should reach out to non-traditional ICANN stakeholders | SIIA |
| Independent Audit | Along with the technical audits, there should be new mechanism to address transparency, decision-making processes and organizational issues | Spain |
| Independent Audit | Independent Audit of ICANN's performance in meeting specific performance goals, such as adherence to AOC, Bylaws and AoI. Includes recommendation implementation, ability for complaints on non-compliance. Outcomes should include detailed explanations of ICANN's failures to comply | |
| Inspector General | Create a new inspector general with "full access to ICANN", issuing a report not subject to ICANN approval | Heritage Foundation |
| Internal Controls | Strengthen internal controls and provide language on how ICANN would do that | USCIB |
| Internal Controls | Subject internal controls , internal and external audit to review by a third party | USCIB |
| Jurisdiction | "Consideration should be given to broadening the scope of issues that can be taken up before the local courts, in particular issues relating to the right to freedom of expression and the rights to privacy and personal security." | NCSG |
| Jurisdiction | "Include a unilateral option clause that would enable a choice between the local courts or arbitration proceedings" | NCSG |
| Jurisdiction | California law provides confidence that ICANN will be held accountable for violations of bylaws/special duties of directors; ICANN leaving jurisdiction should be undertaken "only if there is a demonstrable benefit that clearly outweighs costs", and prepare an in-depth research report including judicial redress opportunities in new mechanisms | USCIB |
| Jurisdiction | Defined dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms should be binding and implementable on ICANN regardless of locale | NRO |
| Jurisdiction | Find ways to ensure that any decisions regarding ICANN's location do not undermine the applicability of California law to its operations, including the obligations applicable to nonprofits | Verizon |
| Jurisdiction | ICANN should explore incorporation as an international organization under international law to add confidence to serve stakeholders uniformly across the globe | NRO |
| Jurisdiction | ICANN's commitment to operating under the rule of law in jurisdictions that support effective redress should be codified as part of process | MPAA |
| Jurisdiction | Prior to ICANN leaving California, it must issue a response explaining why a move is warranted and the legal consequences of the move; conduct a consultation on the proposal | SIIA |
| Jurisdiction | Require ICANN, through Bylaws change, to remain subject to US Court jurisdiction | Heritage Foundation |
| Jurisdiction | Require supermajority Board support for a move out of California | SIIA |
| Metrics | Establish clear metrics and benchmarks to measure improvements in accountability and transparency, published periodically | USCIB |
| Metrics | ICANN should report regularly on compliance with the accountability function | SIIA |
| Mission | ICANN's management and board should be more strictly confined to ICANN's technical mission | BC (Reply) |
| Multilingualism | ICANN needs to stick to the principle of multilingualism in its work and related affairs, so as to greatly facilitate even higher participation from non-English speaking communities | Internet Society of China |
| Ombudsman | Consider granting Ombudsman ability to refer a matter to the external body if created | NCSG |
| Ombudsman | Consider granting powers to set Board decisions or policies aside. However, if external body is put into place, consider if Ombudsman still serves a useful person. | NCSG |
| Ombudsman | Delegate the duty of selecting and retaining the ICANN Ombudsman to the NomCom | Edward Morris |
| Ombudsman | Grant clear authority to investigate any complaint brought by an employee that is related to ICANN accountability | NCSG |
| Organization Size | ICANN's organizational growth should be limited in order to restrict mission creep and unnecessary bureaucracy | TPI |
| Outreach | ICANN should organize regional meetings (and subregional meetings) in each content on globalization, multistakeholder models, etc. | Kilnam Choi |
| Policy Development | ICANN policy development is prone to be made exclusive by "closed clubs", leading to decision capture. Transparency needs to be part of the bottom up model | CNNIC |
| Policy Development | ICANN should follow the principle of user-first during its whole policy-making process | Internet Society of China |
| Policy Development | Move policy development from separate SOs to a broader community process to achieve rough community consensus across the community prior to Board action - achieve through multistakeholder house creation for meeting at ICANN meetings, with a place for experts as well | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Policy Separation | Maintain structural separation of IANA Functions Dept. employees from policy activities relating to those functions | |
| Policy Separation | Separate between names/numbering and the IANA functions | USCIB |
| Policy Separation | Separate IANA functions from policy making | Milton Mueller |
| Policy Separation | Separate the IANA Functions from ICANN, with policy function within ICANN now overseen by "Internet Freedom Panel" - a private sector board with no government members with the power to veto "proposed changes to the DNS deemed to threaten the freedom, stability, or security of the Internet." | Heritage Foundation |
| Public Comment | As carefully considered and substantiated comments are not accurately reflected in staff summaries, the ATRT2 recommendation for a process for changes to summary reports is endorsed | BC (Reply) |
| Public Comment | Consider changing deadlines for comment processes if a majority of stakeholder groups request changes | SIIA |
| Public Comment | ICANN should analyze inputs from stakeholders, not just list them, and describe why stakeholder recommendations were/not adopted | SIIA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | "The full review process should account for errors as well as ethical lapses" | NCSG |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | A core issue for strengthening ICANN accountability is a better appeals process, not to undermine the policy development process, but for the circumstances where the Board or the staff makes serious mistakes that call into question the fairness of its process or the level of community support for a declared consensus | Milton Mueller |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | A new third-party mechanism for accountability and redress should be created, with independence from ICANN and a meaningful scope of authority | Verizon |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Allow independent review for situations where Board's decision on reconsideration was arbitrary and capricious | |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Allow reconsideration when Board or staff acts "arbitrarily or capriciously" (import from administrative procedures - clear error of judgment); allow for further appeal from reconsideration to independent arbitrators selected jointly | |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | ATRT recommendation on reviewing the Independent Review mechanisms should be initiated as soon as possible, with a minimal goal to create and external appeals mechanism that could produce binding decisions as allowed under California and other applicable law | Avri Doria |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Baseline of new version should be reviewing ICANN Board adherence to Bylaws and providing meaningful redress in instances of violation | MPAA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Create a new external, multistakeholder and independent body that would review the Board's decisions and actions and respond to appeals subject to rules on standing and applicable grounds for review, to be defined in this process. No ICANN Board or staff member should be able to sit on it to safeguard "independence"; Consider whether the body should include those elected by SO/AC | NCSG |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Deadlines for filing reconsideration need to be longer than 15 days | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Declarations of BGC or IRP panel should be given more weight; should not be able to be rejected by simple majority | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Develop a permanent IRP, with the authority to impose consequences on ICANN for failure to implement IRP rulings | BC (Reply) |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Develop permanent cross community working group with role to impose external accountability on ICANN, with representation from each GNSO constituency plus ccNSO, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, IETF, ASO and NRO, with powers including naming representatives to AoC review teams, invoking the IRP, defining the process for appointing members to the IRP, reviewing and approving ICANN budgets, approving changes to ICANN's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, and trigger recall of ICANN's Board and immediate selection of new members | BC (Reply) |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Expand composition of Board Governance Committee to allow non-members to bring fresh perspective for Reconsideration matters | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Expand grounds for challenging decisions deemed "inconsistent with ICANN procedures, ill-advised and potentially harmful for the requestor's interests or, in the case of governments, public interests" | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Expand Independent Review to address "all matters relating to ICANN's operation." | Heritage Foundation |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | ICANN should bear at least 50% of costs of Independent Review to make more affordable | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | ICANN should establish an independent Inspector General function with dedicated funding mechanism, with authority to investigate and ensure compliance with the Bylaw, procedures for decision-making, and potential conflicts of interest | SIIA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | ICANN should permanently fund the IRP | BC (Reply) |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | IRP decisions should be binding and contain rationale, and always be made public | NCSG |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | IRP panels should be obliged to issue declaration within six months of filing, not just "strive" | SIIA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | IRP provider should not be designated - it should be a matter for agreement between ICANN and each requester and the IRP panelists | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | IRP reviews should be invoked by community concerns about actions taken by ICANN management and Board, through the development of a structural element of representatives of each constituency and stakeholder group | BC (Reply) |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Lower threshold conditions to succeed in processes; current requirements are too narrow | Spain |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Make the Cooperative Engagement process open and transparent | Edward Morris |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | New body should be autonomous and self-governing and not be altered or swayed by Board vote; funding mechanism should be established | MPAA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Once established, changes to any new body should require supermajority vote of Board based upon significant input | MPAA |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Remove the loser pays model of the IRP, and implement a sliding scale for fees | Edward Morris |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Reverse the Bylaws changes that limit redress under the IRP | Edward Morris |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | Strengthen the Office of the Ombudsman into a separate judicial function, including community leaders and judicial experts | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | The CEP process needs transparency, including providing records of discussion and advance notice of a clear process applying to all parties | Robin Gross |
| Reconsideration & Independent Review | The Reconsideration process need to be more responsive to community concerns and less protective of decisions made by ICANN, therefore we endorse the ATRT2 recommendation to explore options for restructuring | BC (Reply) |
| Reporting | Develop a process to review the subsequent implementation of recommendations by ICANN management, potentially through future ATRT reviews | BC |
| Reporting | ICANN can assure the community that it is meeting its accountability commitments through open reporting of periodic reviews | Brian Carpenter |
| Reporting | Post-project reviews, not just lessons-learned documents, need to be formalized to introduce systemic follow-up | DNA |
| Reporting | There should be mechanisms for measuring, evaluating and reporting on ICANN's compliance with its obligations to improve accountability | Verizon |
| Representation | Full spectrum of GNSO Stakeholders should be represented in ICANN deliberations | SIIA |
| Representation | ICANN needs to increase representation of domain name registrants and consumers/internet users, and diminish the presence and voices of those with profit-motives at stake in ICANN decisions, workings and outcomes | Domain Mondo |
| Representation | ICANN should recognize fully the important voices of businesses in any evolving ecosystem | Verizon |
| Representation | ICANN structure needs to be representative | Seun Ojedeji |
| Representation | There is a need to assure that the role and voice of the business sector is heard as it will be integral to ensure governmental support of any new ICANN framework resulting from the accountability process | INTA |
| Resources | ICANN staff for SOs and ACs, while they have done a great job, may have independence issues in their work; each constituency should fund a coordinating role for its community | CENTR |
| Review | Subject ICANN to external review of accountability and transparency procedures | Edward Morris |
| Role of Governments | Reaffirm advisory role of GAC | Heritage Foundation |
| Role of Governments | Revise Bylaws to require consensus for GAC advice | Heritage Foundation |
| Separation | If transition results with ICANN having a strong role with respect to the IANA functions, those functions and the ICANN functions should be subject to a clear separation that is monitored by an independent third party | Verizon |
| Staff | Though current supporting staff for SO/AC have been doing an "exceptional job", they lack the independence to provide unbiased advise; communities should consider putting in place a dedicated resource who could, on behalf of the particular community, take on the advisory or coordination role. This would be funded by the respective communities, not ICANN | LACTLD |
| Staff | Consult NomCom for the appointment of ICANN Executives and global staff positions, with a broad, long-term directive for regional and/or geographic balance | Sivasubramanian Muthusamy |
| Stakeholder Participation | All supporting organizations and affiliate organizations to put in place accountability and transparency mechanisms similar or aligned to those of ICANN | Fiona Asonga |
| Structure | As outlined in the Tunis Agenda, states are responsible for public policy issues | Just Net Coalition |
| Structure | Direct democracy principles should be considered; democratic vote as the ultimate decision maker will be a powerful tool to counter any attempt by governments or international institutions to take over ICANN; this could potentially be done through registrars and WHOIS, with eligibility requirements set out | Konrad von Finckenstein |
| Structure | Envision structural separation for some of the IANA functions - a Swiss non-profit association requesting immunity - to perform the root zone management function. Members of this association would be domain name registries (gTLD and ccTLD) and would fund; ICANN would be the interface between gTLD registries and the new entity | Just Net Coalition |
| Structure | ICANN should become a membership organization, with the membership having ultimate decision-making authority. The membership would elect the Board and could override any decision of the Board. The membership would consist of all registrants of domain names controlled by ICANN (gTLDs) | Just Net Coalition |
| Structure | ICANN should switch to a public benefits corporation with members, the structure of which can and should be based on the current community structures, with provisions made for inclusion of groups not yet involved in the ICANN community | Edward Morris |
| Term Limits | Mandate senior officers to have a maximum 9 years in office, with a supermajority vote for confidence every 3 years | Heritage Foundation |
| Transparency | Board meetings should be regularly audio-cast on the web and archived, as are GNSO Council meetings | Robin Gross |
| Transparency | Board minutes should be more detailed, with minority opinions and diversity of opinions expressed more fully incorporated | Robin Gross |
| Transparency | Enhance transparency into ICANN's policymaking and technical processes, including through use of a FOIA-like process | Verizon |
| Transparency | Greater public notice should be provided regarding the agenda of Board meetings | Robin Gross |
| Transparency | ICANN should implement its functions of management and coordination of Internet resources in a more transparent way | Internet Society of China |
| Transparency | ICANN should increase the transparency of Board deliberations and meetings, with at least one open meeting with a substantive agenda at each ICANN meeting | BC (Reply) |
| Transparency | Maintain an open/transparent/accessible website | DeeDee Halleck |
| Transparency | Make clear to readers when policy questions are implicated in documents | SIIA |
| Transparency | The activities and deliberations of the GAC needs to be strengthened; the public has a right to know how its governmental representative are performing and policy positions they are taking in the GAC | Robin Gross |