At-Large Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) - Proposed Accountability Enhancements (Work Stream 1) Workspace
Comment Close | Statement | Status | Assignee(s) | Call for | Call for | Vote Open | Vote Close | Date of Submission | Staff Contact and Email | Statement Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
12.06.2015 | ADOPTED 15Y, 0N, 0A | @Alan Greenberg | 01.06.2015 | 06.06.2015 23:58 UTC | 06.06.2015 23:59 UTC | 11.06.2015 23:59 UTC | 11.06.2015 | Accountability Staff acct-staff@icann.org | AL-ALAC-ST-0615-01-00-EN |
For information about this Public Comment, please click here 
FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED
FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC
FINAL DRAFT - REVISED - For Approval - 05 June 22:44 UTC
FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED
Revised version posted 03 June 2015 05:30 UTC
Revised version posted 02 June 2015 04:24 UTC
Posted 01 June 2015 05:25 UTC
Note: CCWG Proposal PDF
Comments
Just browsed through the document:
Line 103: UA is not defined anywhere
Line 199: Missing "T" after the ":"
Line 206: A&T is not defined anywhere
Also, I have a concern: I looked at the CCWG proposal and in the cover page it says: "These recommendations are not presented as the consensus of the CCWG-Accountability." Does this imply that the CCWG draft proposal was put out just by a sub-set of its members?
Interesting question Eduardo.
In the document very often the proposal is not unique, but the group is asking for the inputs from the community.
For exemple membership vs designators vs status quo are open for discussion.
But in the same time the summary reference only to the membership solution.
We all agree to put this report for comments but from my POV from a more open expectation.
Is just that I do not remember seen a caption like this in a document requesting public comments. As I understand from what you are saying is that there was consensus after all in the context of publishing the document but not in the specifics. Is the expectation then that consensus will be reach depending on the comments that you get?
Yes, if you look in the Executive Summary §03
"This report for public comment represents the current work product of the CCWG-Accountability. It is focused on draft Work Stream 1 recommendations (Work Stream 1 is the CCWG-Accountability’s work on changes to ICANN’s accountability arrangements which must be in place, or committed to, prior to the IANA Stewardship transition), which were the focus of the first five months of work (from December 2014 until May 2015). These recommendations are not presented as the consensus of the CCWG-Accountability at this point. The CCWG-Accountability is seeking confirmation of its approach, and guidance upon several options, from the community."
Sorry, I have been out most of the day.
Yes, Sebastien is correct. Actually, such a comment is not that unusual. For relatively simple issues, a draft report is effectively the full report UNTIL there is community input that might change it. For more complex issues, it is not uncommon to put out a report (thus the title INITIAL DRAFT) that is known to be incomplete and has questions for the community. I have participated in several WGs that have done this.
FYI - AFRALO comment on CCWG Accountability Draft Report: http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/afri-discuss/2015-May/003446.html
The AFRALO community members have received the report of Cross Community Working Group on enhancing the ICANN accountability (CCWG) put for public comment and present the following remarks on the report:
They want first to congratulate the CCWG for the huge amount of work undertaken in a short period of time. Nevertheless, they want to make the following comments:
The creation of fundamental bylaws that require the consent of the community to be changed is a good approach and would enhance the accountability of ICANN board to the community. AFRALO members believe that the fundamental bylaws should include the fundamental standing issues such as the mission and the core values of the organization, excluding any functional or operational issue.
While giving the community the power of recalling the whole board is an appropriate accountability mechanism, it should be the very extreme step to be taken. AFRALO members wish this would never happen. The majority of 75% proposed in the report for such decision looks acceptable.
Recalling one or more board members without reason is an aberration in itself; Its impact would be that the Board directors will act in the interest of the SOs or ACs that appointed them rather than acting in the interest of the entire community ( ICANN as an organization). The AFRALO members believe that such a power shouldn’t exist in the CCWG recommendations.
It shouldn’t exist also because the Board directors appointed by the NomCom would have a different recalling procedure that makes the whole members of ICANN board not having an equal treatment.
AFRALO members appreciate the reinforcement of the Independent review Process, as well as the reconsideration mechanism proposed in the report.
They do not see the unincorporated associations as a good means for SOs and ACs to exercise the powers included in the report because the practical application of the UA setup seem to be problematic and complicated. One of the problems is the fact that some of the community stakeholders may be unable and/or unwilling to become a UA, which means that they will not contribute to the community decision making process while exercising the proposed community powers. Also creating the UA may expose the SO/AC to legal issue as they may be sued within the California jurisdiction, which may harm the community members.
Any other form of legal entity to represent the SOs and ACs wouldn’t be acceptable if it leads to suing those entities in courts.
All the accountability mechanisms should avoid leading to courts as much as possible. In fact, the AFRALO members do not accept that ICANN affairs be managed by courts in whatever the jurisdiction is.
The community group that will act on behalf of the respective community stakeholders to exercise the powers mentioned in the report should be as inclusive as possible. AFRALO members prefer equal footing for all SOs and ACs, but can live with the composition proposed in the report.
The AFRALO community members express their support to the CCWG and think that the report needs further work to find the best ways to empower the community using the right means and avoiding ICANN the risk of being weakened or losing its independence, its inclusiveness and its multi-stakeholder nature.
Recalling one or more board members without reason is an aberration in itself; Its impact would be that the Board directors will act in the interest of the SOs or ACs that appointed them rather than acting in the interest of the entire community ( ICANN as an organization). The AFRALO members believe that such a power shouldn’t exist in the CCWG recommendations.
It shouldn’t exist also because the Board directors appointed by the NomCom would have a different recalling procedure that makes the whole members of ICANN board not having an equal treatment.
Please look at lines 153-198 of the draft ALAC comments and see to what extent that may address your concerns.
Would your concerns on removing AC/SO directors be relieves if it could only be done by the entire community?
Hi Alan,
I think line 162 - 164 may not be the only reason why SO/AC removing its board members should be discouraged. There is also the effect this may have on SO/AC that has more representation on the board compared to those that have less.
ALAC has just 1 so removing that person may not affect the direction of the board as much. There are other SO/AC that has more seats and i don't think we as ALAC should take the implication of that lightly. That said, like i have earlier indicated that its a compromise i can live it but i do hope ALAC would reflect in the statement something similar to the following:
"While we are in support of individual SO/AC removing its board members, at the same time we expect the process of doing that to be strictly defined, justifiable and transparently exercised by respective SO/AC"
Edit: Line 177 .....SO or AC would act in that.....
Regards
Will add that caveat and tanks for catching the error.
Thanks Alan for this first draft.
I would like to provide few comments on this proposal.
Line 32
“the ALAC believes that fostering trust in the DNS” can we add the other identifiers that ICANN take are of?
Line 84:
I have significant concerns about removing one board member or the whole board.
I know that for a lot of people it seems to be the best weapon to have the board acting as the community (not yet completely defined) would like.
Lines 153 and following
Section 5.5 Power: Removing individual ICANN Directors
The Board members are currently elected/selected for 3 years.
A quote from the actual bylaws:
ARTICLE VI: BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Section 7. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies.
If the “the members of the group believe that the person (appointed as Director) shares common values with the group” at the moment of the selection/election process, I am sure it can be the case for 3 years.
Removing individual ICANN Director is in contradiction with its independency.
Lines 197 and 198
If this is the way to go to remove Nomcom appointees the members of a “sub-committee of the NomCom appointed to carry out NomCom-appointed Director removals” must not be eligible to the Board for one year after the end of there term.
Lines 199 and following
5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board[1]
Five Board members are currently elected/selected each year for 3 years.
Recalling the entire ICANN Board must not be supported. It will create more disruption to the whole organization than it will solve the issue(s) under discussion.
Some participants call this possibility the “nuclear option”. The result will be the end of ICANN.
If it could be the goal of some, it can’t be ours.
As AFRALO did publish one hour ago there comments, I would like to express my support.
[1] 5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board: he ALAC supports this mechanism…
Must be 5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board: the ALAC supports this mechanism
The first draft of the ALAC comments is posted above.
It must be submitted on Wednesday, 03 June by 23:59 UTC.
Although the comment covers a lot of areas, I believe that it faithfully reflects (on the whole) what has been contributed on our many teleconferences on the subject).
Please post comments and suggestions here using line numbers to identify target text.
Note that at the start I was inserting the explicit questions asked but found they added little value to the comments already inserted. I will remove these Blue questions in the next version.