Content Comparison

Consolidated Stress Test

Contingencies merged

I. Financial Crisis or Insolvency

(Merged #5, 6, 7, 8 , 9)

ICANN becomes fiscally insolvent, and lacks the resources to adequately meet its obligations. This situation could result from a variety of causes, including financial crisis specific to the domain name industry, or the general global economy. It could also result from a legal judgment against ICANN, fraud or theft of funds, or technical evolution that makes domain name registrations obsolete.

5. Domain industry financial crisis. Consequence: significant reduction in domain sales generated revenues and significant increase in registrar and registry continuity costs, threatening ICANN’s ability to operate.

6. General financial crisis. Consequence: loss affecting reserves sufficient to threaten business continuity.

7. Litigation arising from private contract, e.g., Breach of Contract. Consequence: significant loss of contracted party fees.

8. Technology competing with DNS. Consequence: significant reduction in domain sales generated revenues and significant increase in registrar and registry continuity costs.

9. Major corruption or fraud. Consequence: major impact on corporate reputation, significant litigation and loss of some or all reserves.

II. Failure to Meet Operational Obligations

(Merged #1,2,11, 17, 21)

ICANN fails to process change or delegation requests to the IANA Root Zone, or executes a change or delegation over the objections of stakeholders, such as those defined as 'Significantly Interested Parties' (link)

1. Change authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. Consequence: significant interference with existing policy (or policies) relating to the content of the IANA Root Zone and/or prejudice to the security and stability of one or several TLDs.

2. Delegation authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. Consequence: significant interference with existing policy (or policies) relating to the delegation from the IANA Root Zone and/or prejudice to the security and stability of one or several TLDs..

11. Compromise of credentials. Consequence: major impact on corporate reputation, significant loss of authentication and/or authorization capacities.

17. ICANN attempts to add a new top-level domain in spite of security and stability concerns expressed by technical community or other stakeholder groups. Consequence: DNS security and stability could be undermined, and ICANN actions could impose costs and risks upon external parties.

21. A government telecom minister instructs ICANN to re-delegate a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), despite objections from many current registrants and user communities in the country concerned.

Consequence: Faced with this re-delegation request, ICANN lacks measures to resist re-delegation while awaiting the bottom-up consensus decision of affected stakeholders.

III. Legal/Legislative Action 

(Merged #3, 4, 19, 20)

ICANN is the subject of litigation under existing or future policies, legislation, or regulation. ICANN attempts to delegate a new TLD, or re-delegate a non-compliant existing TLD, but is blocked by legal action.

3. Litigation arising from existing public policy, e.g., Anti-Trust (Sherman Act) Consequence: significant interference with existing policy and/or policy development relating to relevant activities.

4. New regulation or legislation. Consequence: significant interference with existing policies and/or policy development relating to relevant activities.

19. ICANN attempts to re-delegate a gTLD because the registry operator is determined to be in breach of its contract, but the registry operator challenges the action and obtains an injunction from a national court.

Consequence: The entity charged with root zone maintenance could face the question of whether to follow ICANN re-delegation request or to follow the court order.

20. A court order is issued to block ICANN’s delegation of a new TLD, because of complaint by existing TLD operators or other aggrieved parties.

Consequence: ICANN’s decision about whether to honor such a court order could bring liability to ICANN and its contract parties.

IV. Failure of Accountability (Merged #10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 22, 23,24)

Actions (or expenditure of resources) by ICANN Board Members, CEO, or other Staff, are contrary to ICANN’s mission or bylaws. ICANN is “captured” by one stakeholder segment, including governments via the GAC, which is either able to drive its agenda on all other stakeholders, or abuse accountability mechanisms to prevent all other stakeholders from advancing their interests (veto).

10. Chairman, CEO or major officer acting in a manner inconsistent with the organization’s mission. Consequence: major impact on corporate reputation, significant litigation.

12. Capture by one or several groups of stakeholders. Consequence : major impact on trust in multi-stakeholder model, prejudice to other stakeholders.

13. One or several stakeholders excessively rely on accountability mechanism to “paralyze” ICANN. Consequence: major impact on corporate reputation, inability to take decisions, instability of governance bodies, loss of key staff, etc.

16. ICANN engages in programs not necessary to achieve its limited technical mission. For example, uses fee revenue or reserve funds to expand its scope beyond its technical mission, through grants for developing nations or other causes. Consequence: ICANN has the power to determine fees charged to TLD applicants, registries, registrars, and registrants, so it presents a large target for any Internet-related cause seeking funding sources.

18. Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. A majority of governments could thereby approve GAC advice that restricted free online expression, for example.

22. ICANN Board fails to comply with bylaws and/or refuses to accept the decision of a redress mechanism constituted under the bylaws. Consequence: Community loses confidence in multistakeholder structures to govern ICANN.

23. ICANN uses RAA or other agreements to arrange that its counter-parties impose requirements on third parties, allegedly outside scope of ICANN mission. Affected third parties, not being contracted to ICANN, have little or no effective recourse against ICANN; contracted parties, not being implicated by the requirements themselves, do not avail themselves of mechanisms allowing them to challenge ICANN’s decision. Consequence: ICANN seen as a monopoly leveraging power in one market (domain names) into adjacent markets.

24. An incoming Chief Executive institutes a “strategic review” that quickly arrives at a new, extended mission for ICANN; the Board, having just hired the new CEO, approves the new mission and strategy without community consensus. Consequence: Community ceases to see ICANN as the community’s own mechanism for discharging certain limited technical functions, and views ICANN as an independent, sui generis entity with its own agenda, not necessarily supported by the community. Ultimately, comes to question why ICANN’s original (i.e. current) functions should remain in the control of a body that has grown to have a much broader and less widely supported mission.